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No. 8, August 1980



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No. 8, August 1980

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FROM THE TRUMAN TO THE CARTER DOCTRINE: THE REVIVAL OF THE 'POLICY OF STRENGTH'

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[Article by Yu. A. Shvedkov]

[Text] American foreign policy has always been distinguished by pretentious ideological embellishments--references to America's "special" historic mission, talk about the exceptional nature of "American democracy" and claims to a leading role in world affairs, rooted in theological views regarding the "manifest destiny" of the New World. The situation changed somewhat in the first half of the 1970's, when the United States was motivated by the development of international detente to conduct a more realistic course in world affairs, place less emphasis on "power factors" in foreign policy and rely more on businesslike negotiation aimed at a search for solutions to urgent international problems. The Carter Administration, however, began to return to the old tradition quite soon after it assumed power.<sup>1</sup>

Just before the latest State of the Union Message to Congress in January 1980, the pages of Washington newspapers were filled with reports that J. Carter, following the advice of his closest associates, was preparing to set forth a new doctrine, modeled on those which had entered U.S. history through the efforts of the current President's predecessors as the "Truman Doctrine," the "Eisenhower Doctrine," the "Johnson Doctrine" and so forth.

Externally as well, the course of events in Washington was quite similar to all that accompanied the announcement of other U.S. foreign policy doctrines, particularly the Truman Doctrine, which was declared in March 1947 and marked the beginning of the broad-scale launching of cold war. Just as at that time, the President's announcement was preceded by the circulation of a secret memorandum in government circles, appealing for a "tougher" line toward the USSR (at that time it was C. Clifford's memorandum, and now it is Z. Brzezinski's), the rhetoric of official spokesmen regarding the confirmation of America's "leading role" in the world grew in volume, and the President's closest associates argued behind the scenes about the ways of giving this "doctrine" a more promising and impressive appearance. Famous

American diplomat and historian G. Kennan, who was one of the co-authors of the Truman Doctrine and also its first critic, describes the atmosphere preceding its declaration to the American people in his memoirs, writing that he was "struck by the congenital aversion of Americans to taking specific decisions on specific problems, and by their persistent urge to seek universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify particular actions."<sup>2</sup>

In many respects, President Carter's "big speech" in January also filled these requirements and became a unique element of the American political system.

But the President's speech did not have the expected impact. The highly perfected machinery for the production of foreign policy doctrines did not work so smoothly this time. Just a few weeks after Carter's speech in the Capitol, the American press reported that the President and his advisers had become enmeshed in contradictory statements, that White House personnel were "tortured by doubts in the night" and that the doctrine had not worked out. "The President's advisers and the President himself have so confused the meaning of his message," the CHICAGO TRIBUNE commented, "that almost nothing remains which could be categorized as a 'doctrine.'"<sup>3</sup> And prominent Washington correspondent J. Sutherland wrote that the so-called Carter Doctrine could "most accurately be called a pose, and not a mature doctrine."<sup>4</sup>

It was also noted that, in contrast to H. Truman (and D. Eisenhower), J. Carter had been unable to request Congress to reinforce his statement of willingness to defend U.S. "vital interests" by any means, including military, with a corresponding resolution of the American legislative branch. This resulted in a clear violation of the Senate resolution on "national commitments" passed in June 1969, according to which the use of armed forces on foreign territory or the promise to assist a foreign state, government or people through the use of armed force would only be possible as a result of a confirming decision of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government in the form of a treaty, law or joint resolution of both congressional houses, specifically envisaging this commitment. The basic premises of this resolution were reaffirmed by Congress in 1973.<sup>5</sup>

It must be said that the profound doubts in Washington political circles over the meaning of Carter's speech in the Capitol and its significance are not in any sense incidental or temporary. They reflect the increasingly acute conflict between U.S. claims to hegemony in the world and the fundamentally changed postwar realities of the international situation.

We should recall that the first of the postwar American doctrines--the Truman Doctrine--was born when American ruling circles were intoxicated with the growing military and economic power of the United States and seriously intended to cultivate American influence and the American way of

life in other countries that had been ravaged by the war, with the aid of military force if necessary. Most of the subsequent U.S. foreign policy doctrines (like the Eisenhower Doctrine or the Johnson Doctrine) basically marked the extension of the interventionist claims of the Truman Doctrine to new parts of the world. The intrusion of American armed forces into Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and other Indochinese states left its bloody mark on history. The total inconsistency of these actions was demonstrated during the course of many crises in recent decades, particularly in the failure of the aggressive U.S. venture in Vietnam.

Now President Carter has voiced new threats to use armed force in a region far from the shores of the United States, although this nation has had to realize numerous times that other people have no wish to learn how to live in the world from the United States. The American claims to world supremacy, which are once again being voiced in an unadorned form, now appear, more than ever before, to be devoid of moral, political and any other bases.

#### Bankruptcy of Moral and Political Pretexs

The first of the postwar U.S. foreign policy doctrines--the Truman Doctrine, which largely set the pattern for subsequent declarations--was formulated in response to the specific situation in a small mediterranean country--Greece. The decayed and antidemocratic regime in this country, which, even according to the description of American experts, was steeped "in corruption, inefficiency and economic chaos," was perilously close to collapse as a result of civil war and the planned withdrawal of English occupation troops from Greece. Under these difficult conditions, the United States resorted to open military intervention in the internal affairs of Greece, offering this country, and its neighbor Turkey as well, military and economic assistance totaling 400 million dollars.<sup>6</sup> As a consequence of this, American military and civilian "advisers" began to lead the civil war and established total control over the Supreme Defense Council of this country for the purpose of suppressing the revolutionary movement as quickly as possible.

This seemingly "local" action was, as G. Kennan points out, clothed in rhetoric that was "more grandiose and more sweeping than anything that I, at least, had ever envisaged."<sup>7</sup> This rhetoric soon began to live an independent and self-sufficient existence, permeating and directing Washington's subsequent foreign policy documents and actions.

First of all, the President said in a speech to Congress on 12 March 1947 that "United States policy must (the word "must," incidentally, was written in by the President) consist in the support of free people who are trying to resist enslavement on the part of armed minorities or outside pressure."<sup>8</sup> The slogan of "defending" the freedom of other people was therefore used as camouflage for intervention for the purpose of exporting counterrevolution and supporting anti-people dictatorial regimes, first in Greece and then in many other countries. A prominent American political figure of that time,

H. Wallace, then noted that many of his countrymen were wondering "how the support of the undemocratic governments in Greece and Turkey could further the cause of freedom."<sup>9</sup>

In the second place, H. Truman's speech contained the first mention of the so-called "domino theory," according to which the fall of a pro-Western order in one country would automatically be followed by the collapse of this order in many other countries. He alleged that the inability of the United States to "help" Greece and Turkey would have "far-reaching consequences, both for the West and for the East."<sup>10</sup> This "theory" later served numerous times to justify acts of U.S. armed intervention in various parts of the world, including Indochina.

The widely advertised moral and political pretexts of the Truman Doctrine could not, however, as many serious American researchers have admitted, conceal the extremely specific interests of American oil monopolies, which were already striving to get a firmer hold on the "black gold" of the Near and Middle Eastern countries. It is indicative that 5 days before Truman's speech in Congress, his closest adviser, C. Clifford, proposed the inclusion of a special paragraph regarding this matter in the draft of the speech. But this proposal was rejected at the initiative of then Under Secretary of State D. Acheson, who believed that the unadorned argument regarding the preservation of American "free enterprise" and its "free access" to the mineral resources of the Near and Middle East would weaken U.S. claims that its actions were primarily motivated by a desire to defend the "freedom" of other countries and peoples.<sup>11</sup>

The next American foreign policy doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was set forth in a special congressional resolution on 9 March 1957, was supposed to be a response to the declaration of an independent course in Egyptian foreign policy and the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. This doctrine, which was essentially a formal act extending the Truman Doctrine to the countries of the Near and Middle East, envisaged the offer of military assistance and, "if necessary," the use of military force "against armed aggression on the part of any country controlled by international communism" (Egypt was thought to be one of these countries at that time--Yu. Sh.), if any state should ask the United States to do this.<sup>12</sup> This stipulation was supposed to lend the appearance of legality to the American leadership's interventionist intrigues. From the memoirs of D. Eisenhower, it is quite obvious that the government officials who worked out the doctrine bearing his name were concerned primarily with controlling the "underground reserves of oil feeding the homes and factories of Western Europe."<sup>13</sup> However, just as in the case of the Truman Doctrine, the concern of the United States with access to oil was not officially reflected in this new doctrine, and the slogans of "defending" other people against "communist aggression" remained on the surface.

The false nature of the anticommunist rhetoric of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and of other U.S. foreign policy doctrines as well, is attested to by the following fact. In the one case when this doctrine was put in action--the



landing of the American Marines in Lebanon in 1958--it was connected not with some kind of "threat" on the part of a state "controlled by international communism," but with an attempt by the United States to change the situation in this part of the world in its own favor after the bloody regime of Nuri al-Sa'id had been overthrown in Iraq by military men acting on nationalist motives.

The same kind of messianic and anticommunist spirit was expressed in the Johnson Doctrine of 1965, which many people have now forgotten. It was aimed at preventing the birth of another (after Cuba--Yu. Sh.) "communist state" in the Western Hemisphere.

The principal moral and political premises of these doctrines aroused increasing criticism, both at the time they were made public and in subsequent years, from several politicians, journalists and researchers in the United States, such as H. Wallace, G. Kennan, W. Lippmann, H. Morgenthau and others. Wallace felt, for example, that the Truman Doctrine was an "appeal for counterrevolution."<sup>14</sup> Kennan and Lippmann believed that the sweeping nature of Truman's rhetoric would compel the United States to intervene in many remote parts of the world on the side of its reactionary clients even if this would be contrary to the real interests of Americans. Morgenthau saw the Truman Doctrine as an "incorrect response" to the U.S. "challenge" abroad and warned that the groundless association of any revolution with so-called "communist aggression" would result in many undesirable conflicts and failures for U.S. foreign policy.<sup>15</sup>

The critics of the Truman Doctrine later acknowledged that the adherence to its precepts had created considerable problems for other countries and misery for the Americans. American researcher C. Crab summarized the disillusioning results of U.S. attempts to intervene in the affairs of other countries and peoples on the pretext of concern for their interests. In his book "Policy-Makers and Critics," he wrote that "in most cases attempts to cultivate democracy on foreign soil have produced a harvest of anti-Americanism and hatred for the United States. In many cases, this has discredited political movements associated with the foreign power. In America and in the foreign states involved, these attempts aroused hopes and expectations which were never realized, and this soon gave rise to feelings of futility and disillusionment on both sides. When the price of American intervention in political affairs of other societies for the purpose of encouraging democracy and human rights becomes obvious--and the Americans usually slip off to the sidelines to avoid paying the price--the United States is accused of being 'hypocritical' and not 'sincerely' committed to the cause of freedom abroad."<sup>16</sup> Naturally, all of this is said quite gently, but it is completely convincing.

In reference to this hypocrisy, it is not hard to find examples of it. In 1971, in one of the United States' allied countries--Pakistan--more than 1 million people were killed and around 10 million had to flee for their lives from the territory of East Bengal as a result of a case of genocide

unprecedented in modern history and surpassed only by the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. On 6 April 1971 the personnel of the American consulate in Dacca, stunned by the atrocities that were taking place, sent a cable to the State Department. It said that, in failing to denounce the suppression and atrocities, "our government has evidenced what many will call moral bankruptcy." And what happened afterward? The U.S. assistant secretary of state hastily described this cable from the indignant personnel of his own State Department as an "overreaction," and the U.S. Government, American researcher R. Morris points out in his book "Uncertain Greatness," continued, as if nothing had happened, to support the Pakistani Government which was engaging widely in genocide against its own people.<sup>17</sup> "High moral principles" did not keep the U.S. Government from expressing support in the United Nations for the puppets of the overthrown Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea.

In both cases, the "blindness" of Washington officials was not due to insufficient knowledge of the situation, but to the policy of "playing up" to the Beijing leaders.

On the whole, the basic postulates of the postwar U.S. foreign policy doctrines had been severely compromised and undermined by the beginning of the 1970's. The new Nixon Doctrine was also contradictory. On the one hand it emphasized such catchwords as "negotiation," but on the other it appealed for reliance on "partnership" and "strength." "Partnership" signified the hope of strengthening some "regional powers," particularly Iran, as allies of the United States. The revolutionary events in Iran stunned the Americans and shattered all of these expectations.

Now President Carter, submitting his "own" foreign policy doctrine, has discarded all of the previous moral and political pretexts for U.S. interventionist actions in the world arena. He was forced to do this by the realities of international life, which are unfavorable for American ruling circles. The Carter Administration's attempts to renovate the moral facade of American foreign policy with the aid of the "human rights" campaign have lost their novelty and have also been discredited. Like a boomerang, this campaign rebounded against its creators when the shah's regime in Iran collapsed, and it confronted them with a sarcastic grin during the process of the United States' present flirtation with the dictatorial regime in Pakistan.

The President set forth his new doctrine in a fairly distinct and open form: "Any attempt by any outside power to establish control over the Persian Gulf zone will be regarded as an attack on U.S. vital interests, and this attack will be repulsed by any means necessary, including military force."<sup>18</sup>

In this doctrine, the claims to "defend" the interests of other countries have been replaced with a simple reference to the "vital interests" of the United States. Apart from the fact that this is obviously contrary to the

universally recognized standards of international law, it is noteworthy that the phrasing is so "frank" and that all pretexts have been discarded.

When President Eisenhower was preparing to present his "doctrine" to the Congress, the Democratic majority leader in the Senate, S. Rayburn, was attempting to replace its contrived phrases with more simple statements. He suggested declaring that "the United States regards as its vital interest the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Middle Eastern states and will use its armed forces to attain these goals if necessary." In answer to the question of whether the administration would agree to this change, Secretary of State J. F. Dulles replied unequivocally in the negative, with the President's approval. "A resolution expressed in these words," he said, "will look like an attempt to establish an American protectorate over the Near and Middle Eastern countries with no consideration for the desires of the people of the Near and Middle East.... It will violate the UN Charter by appealing for military actions to overthrow any regime which falls under communist control by peaceful means."<sup>19</sup> What seemed so unacceptable and odious to Eisenhower and Dulles apparently suits the Carter Administration very well. The section of the Carter Doctrine pertaining to the use of force in the Persian Gulf zone does not contain even a hint of consideration for the interests and desires of the people of this region.

Carter is referring to U.S. "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf zone as the chief justification for the threatened use of force. The majority of American experts, however, including those who work for the government, concluded long ago that the very term "vital interests" had no precise definition and that this was simply a kind of formula used to justify the imperialist ambitions of the United States. In particular, this was unequivocally discussed in the documents compiled in 1975 at the request of the U.S. Government and Congress for the Murphy Commission, which was investigating U.S. foreign policy practices.<sup>20</sup>

In an attempt to somehow explain the concept of U.S. "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf zone, a top-level representative of the current administration could not come up with anything more suitable than a simple reference to existing "reality."

What is this "reality"? President Carter has mentioned the United States' dependence on shipments of oil from the Persian Gulf zone. Former Secretary of State C. Vance clarified this remark in a speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 3 March 1980 when he stated that approximately 25 percent of all the oil imported each year by the United States comes from this part of the world. It is obvious that this degree of dependence is not critical, and it is also known that the United States is not making use of many oil deposits on its own territory. The important thing here is that it is much more profitable for the American monopolies to extract the cheap oil that is the irreplaceable property of the people of the Near and Middle East and other oil-producing regions than to develop energy resources in their own nation.



Apparently realizing that this argument was weak, Vance also said that the countries of Western Europe, Japan and some of the developing countries are even more dependent on shipments of oil from this region than the United States. This is true, but this cannot justify the U.S. declaration of the Persian Gulf zone as a sphere of its own "vital interests," not to mention the U.S. threat to use military force. Nothing is more obvious than the fact that the escalation of tension in this region and the threat to use force are precisely the greatest obstacles to uninterrupted oil deliveries. Besides this, it is also known that the slogan regarding "free access" to oil resources is merely being used to camouflage the endeavors of American monopolies to take complete control over these resources. After the declaration of the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, English, French and Italian companies were crowded out of this region by their American rivals, who reigned supreme until the people of the zone began to nationalize the petroleum industry.

Other attempts to justify American threats to use force in the Persian Gulf zone have also been confusing and contradictory--for example, the references to "outside" attempts to establish control over this region or, as a top-level administration spokesman put it, "more complex circumstances, including internal difficulties" in the countries of the region. In fact, this is simply a case of the arbitrary threat of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries with the use of military force in spite of all international legal standards.

It is also interesting that the American Administration's spokesmen have completely refused to specify the particular countries they have in mind when they speak of the Persian Gulf zone. Under these conditions, it is understandable that the promises of direct military support that have been given to various Southwest Asian countries by some U.S. officials are arousing confusion and indignation even within the American Congress. Astute Washington journalist J. Anderson wrote the following in connection with the Pakistan visit of the President's national security adviser: "Of all Brzezinski's promises to Zia-ul-Haq, the most disturbing was his statement that the United States would come to Pakistan's aid in the event of a Soviet invasion. One angry member of Congress asserted that existing treaties between the United States and Pakistan do not obligate us to go to war for the Zia-ul-Haq regime."<sup>21</sup>

These vague and often contradictory statements of the American Administration are the best indication that the motives used to justify the Carter Doctrine are even less convincing than those which Washington's previous foreign policy doctrines tried unsuccessfully to reinforce.

### Weakening of Bases of Strength

The significance of the variety of excuses used for U.S. interventionist actions in the world arena naturally cannot be limited exclusively to the moral and political sphere. Since the time of the Truman Doctrine's

conception, they, in conjunction with constant allegations about the existence of a "Soviet military threat," were intended to "energize," according to the terminology of that time, the public of the United States and the other Western countries and create prerequisites for the establishment of a "situation of superior strength" to the Soviet Union--economic, political and military strength. All of the then classified fundamental National Security Council documents which represented a continuation and development of the Truman Doctrine, including the now well-known NSC-68 document, stipulated that the main goal of the United States was the creation of this superior strength.

Imitating his predecessors, Carter is now also trying to speak the language of force. During a talk in the White House with representatives of American student youth on 18 February, he said: "We are strong and we have no much self-confidence that we can take actions that others cannot allow themselves to take."

It is a well-known fact, however, that the days when U.S. ruling circles could cherish illusions of a "situation of strength" are long gone. This is why notes of uncertainty and confusion can be heard more and more frequently in the self-confident statements of American Administration spokesmen. For example, after his unequivocal threat to use force in the Persian Gulf zone on 23 January, the President said the following on 29 January: It would be "wrong" to say that the United States hopes to have enough military strength and enough military presence, now or in the future, to "defend this region unilaterally."<sup>22</sup>

Other representatives of the American Administration are also making more frequent mention of the need to involve the United States' allies in the implementation of the Carter Doctrine. "The United States must now depend on the assistance of Europe and Japan for a new cold war," commented the American magazine BUSINESS WEEK, "and there is absolutely no guarantee that they will agree to take part in a new crusade."<sup>23</sup> Secretary of Defense H. Brown said that the President's doctrine regarding the Persian Gulf zone would depend on the "support of the population of this region," and not just military support "but also political support and the willingness to fight."<sup>24</sup>

But the American leaders saw no need to consult in advance with their Western allies or the Persian Gulf countries, but simply, as an official Washington spokesman reported, "informed" them of the "general content" of Carter's coming speech.

After this speech, not one of the countries in the Persian Gulf zone expressed official support for Carter's basic premises. Some of them rejected the Carter Doctrine in no uncertain terms. Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Kuwait, responded on 19 February 1980 to the U.S. threats and military preparations by saying that oil shipments were unimpeded and that he did not know the reason for "all this nonsense in our region."

Western European press organs also had to call attention to the negative reaction of the Persian Gulf states and other developing countries to the Carter Doctrine. Here, for example, is what West Germany's STERN magazine had to say:

"The more dependent the West is on Arab oil, the more senseless it is to unilaterally declare this region a sphere of U.S. interests without the consent or even the knowledge of the oil-producing states. This kind of great-power policy is repelling these countries instead of attracting them to the side of the West."<sup>25</sup>

The U.S. efforts to secure at least partial support for the Carter Doctrine from its Western European allies and Japan also had little effect. The conference of the leaders of the West's "big seven" in Venice at the end of June demonstrated once again that there are serious disagreements between the United States and its chief allies over several economic and political issues.

The first postwar American presidents could allow themselves a luxury when they announced their doctrines: Intoxicated with strength and power, they could act alone, without worrying about the reactions of their clients and partners. The United States then controlled the entire financial system of the West, it had vast gold reserves and its balance of payments invariably had an impressive positive balance. American foreign policy documents of that time, as well as the memoirs of U.S. statesmen, contain almost no references to consultations with other countries prior to the adoption of important foreign policy decisions.

The situation had changed radically by the end of the 1970's. The Western financial system that had taken shape after World War II had virtually disintegrated, the dollar had ceased to be the only world currency, the exchange rate of the dollar began to fall dramatically, U.S. gold and currency reserves were noticeably depleted, the balance of payments began to evidence a large deficit, and the U.S. economy began to suffer from galloping inflation. In 1977-1978 the deficit in the balance of payments reached tens of billions of dollars. It is true that Washington was able to eliminate the negative balance in 1979. By January and, in particular, February 1980, however, the American balance of payments was again dramatically negative in connection with the rising price of oil and the increased imports of oil from abroad. Many experts in the United States concluded that only the radical resolution of the energy problem could help Washington overcome the critical state of the American balance of payments in the future.

Strictly speaking, the more realistic U.S. policy line connected with international detente was the only reaction to the changed balance of world power. It was a justifiable and natural reaction. Now the American leaders are more nervous about the scales of progressive advances throughout the world and are trying to sail the U.S. ship of state against the current of world events.

Under these conditions and in view of the constantly increasing amounts of American aid to such clients as, for example, Israel and Egypt, it is quite apparent that the United States alone, without the financial support of its allies, will hardly be able to pay all of the expenses connected with the implementation of the Carter Doctrine. Understandable indignation is being aroused in the West by the U.S. failure, even under these conditions, "to consult with its allies when it announced its willingness to use force in the Persian Gulf," as was reported, in particular, by the WASHINGTON POST on 14 February. After this, naturally, American diplomacy went into action. Later, Washington's emissaries in the capitals of the Western world tried to mobilize funds for the support of American clients and the accomplishment of military preparations in Southwest Asia. Judging by all indications, however, the efforts to consolidate the economic strength of the Western countries are encountering serious opposition.

This is understandable. The Western European countries and Japan derived sizeable positive results from the policy of detente and the normalization of international trade and they are not willing to give it all up at this time. "It is obvious," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported on 24 February 1980, "that Carter is treating NATO just as his predecessors were inclined to treat it when Washington really was the deciding military power and when no one, neither friends nor enemies, had any other choice. But the times have changed. The world has become more complex." Washington's attempts to "straighten out" the leaders of such countries as France and the FRG in May and June 1980 only complicated relations within the Western world.

The development of the American-Iranian crisis and the limited support with which Western Europe and Japan have responded to the measures the American Administration is trying to take against Iran provide further proof of this.

The consolidation of political forces in support of the Carter Doctrine within the United States has not been an easy matter either. Truman implemented his doctrine by cultivating rabid anticommunism in American domestic life and creating a governmental mechanism to wage a cold war against the USSR and other socialist countries. The declaration of the doctrine was quickly followed by an order to "check the loyalty" of civil servants, and the era of McCarthyism and "witch hunts" began soon afterward. The National Security Council, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency--the most important bodies for the conduct of policy from a "position of strength"--were established in accordance with the National Security Act in summer 1947. These methods were used, both inside and outside the U.S. government apparatus, to create a so-called "consensus"--a definite rallying of forces round America's interventionist foreign policy line. Criticism of this line was extremely timid and critics were forced to remain silent.

Now the situation is different. Although much of the machinery of the cold war era has not been dismantled in the United States, it is highly



unlikely that U.S. domestic political life could regress to the era of unbridled anticommunism or that the "consensus" on foreign policy issues, which fell apart after the defeat in Vietnam, could be restored on this basis. This is attested to by the mounting criticism in the United States of the Carter Doctrine and the related "tough line" in U.S. foreign policy.

The basic postulates of the Carter Doctrine have been pointedly disputed by G. Kennan. He accuses its authors of "employing warnings and unfounded assumptions to create a danger which cannot be clearly discerned." He writes: "Instead of concentrating on increasing the potential for intervention, the government should work on a new program to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil."<sup>26</sup>

It is extremely indicative that politicians who were recently part of the Carter Administration are now agreeing with Kennan's criticism. They include former Director P. Warnke of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former Director J. Gilligan of the Agency for International Development. At a press conference in Washington on 19 February 1980, these men stressed the dangers connected with the threat of U.S. military intervention in the Third World countries. They said that anti-American feelings in these countries are largely a response to U.S. economic domination and U.S. support of the dictatorial regimes which "oppress, torture and rob their own people." The resignation of Secretary of State C. Vance provided more proof of the tense atmosphere within the U.S. Government. Carter's chief rival within the Democratic Party in the race for the presidency, Senator E. Kennedy, also felt the need to harshly criticize the foreign policy of the Carter Administration.

The criticism of the Carter Administration's foreign policy by politicians of various currents became particularly pointed in connection with the administration's inability to resolve the U.S.-Iranian crisis. The 25 March 1980 issue of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE had the following to say on this matter: "Talks in Washington and Boston with figures prominent in international affairs indicate real fear and the feeling that things have gone out of control." It is indicative that the day after National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski's statement about the "threat to Iran on the part of the Soviet Union," an official State Department spokesman denied these fabrications, asserting that the State Department had no grounds for this assumption.

When the Carter Doctrine is discussed in the Pentagon and related circles, three noteworthy facts are apparent. The first is that, according to knowledgeable American military experts, the United States cannot hope for the kind of military advantage in Southwest Asia that was relied upon in the past by Truman and Eisenhower when they announced their doctrines. It does not have enough strength to deal with sociopolitical changes in this part of the world, and the use of military force cannot guarantee the resolution of problems arising there.

The second fact is connected with "moral considerations." After World War II the United States had more than enough trained and disciplined military personnel. Now things are different. The unjust aggressive war against the people of Indochina contributed to the moral degradation of U.S. armed forces personnel. Many works on this subject have already been published in the United States, particularly the book "Crisis of Command. Mismanagement in the Army" by R. Gabriel and P. Savage.

It is no secret that the Pentagon leadership tried to overcome declining morale and discipline in the American Armed Forces by repealing the draft and creating a professional army. Many facts testify that these attempts have not been very successful. When Secretary of Defense H. Brown spoke before a Senate committee on 22 February 1980, he had to admit that all branches of the American Armed Forces are encountering serious problems in satisfying the demands of personnel, and that these problems will continue to be among the most serious Pentagon concerns in the 1980's. The President's move toward the restoration of the compulsory draft by requiring draft-age youth to register has already aroused the same kind of dissatisfaction among students that was typical of the attitude of American youth toward involvement in new military ventures in the world arena.

The third fact is connected with the economic consequences of an escalated arms race and military preparations. In his speech before the Senate committee, H. Brown implied that the expansion of military production would increase employment and alleviate inflation in the United States. Many influential American economists, however, are warning that increased military spending under present conditions could raise the wave of inflation even higher and make the limitation of the growth of unemployment more difficult.

All of the experience in the declaration and implementation of postwar U.S. foreign policy doctrines, just as the envisaged maneuvers in the implementation of the Carter Doctrine, indicate above all that the United States cannot cope with the irresistible "winds of the times" that are blowing across the entire world; it is capable neither of supporting the desire of people for independence and progress nor of keeping them from attaining these goals. It has ripped off its mask of concern for the interests of others and has faced the world once again as an overtly imperialist state striving for expansion and supremacy in the world, caring neither about the means it employs to attain these goals nor the desires of other states and peoples.

#### FOOTNOTES

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**CRISIS OF THE STATE-MONOPOLY REGULATION POLICY IN CANADA**

**Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 15-28**

**[Article by L. A. Nemova and V. V. Popov]**

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## UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGICAL CONTACTS WITH CHINA

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pp 29-37

[Article by A. A. Nagornyy and A. B. Parkanskiy]

[Text] The "China factor" has been assigned a prominent place in the new foreign policy doctrine<sup>1</sup> announced by Washington in January 1980. The emphasis on rapprochement with Beijing is being substantiated by the "parallel" strategic interests of the United States and PRC in connection with the "mounting Soviet threat." A tangible sign of this policy was the Carter Administration's declared willingness to aid in the accelerated economic, scientific and technical development of China, a willingness which has been closely and unequivocally associated in recent months with the general U.S. strategy of aggravating international affairs.

In the context of Washington's present and projected moves in relations with China, bilateral scientific and technical ties are acquiring increasing significance, and their scales and content are affecting the entire complex of U.S.-Chinese relations while remaining a derivative of the strategic intrigues of the political leadership of both countries, based on ideas of hegemony and anti-Sovietism.

The Washington Administration has been preparing the soil for an official decision to give China technological assistance, within the framework of its general approach to Beijing, for several years now, at least since May 1978 (when Z. Brzezinski, the American President's national security adviser, visited Beijing). At the basis of this approach lay the idea that the advanced technological, scientific and technical base of the United States could be one of the instruments used to attach Beijing to the United States, a means of further activating great-power chauvinism and anti-Sovietism and a way of playing the "China card" in relations with the Soviet Union. On the strength of this, the PRC was categorized in summer 1979 as a "developing friendly" state--that is, a state warranting assistance. Since the beginning of 1980 this formula has been widely used in statements by the Carter Administration's leading members.

Washington is now defining the scales and limits of this collaboration. At the same time, the American side hopes to receive in exchange broad access to various fields of Chinese science, which would allow it to keep a constant watch on the technological progress of the PRC. One important stimulus for the American side is the possibility of conducting political surveillance and influencing the Chinese scientific elite by means of scientific contacts.

What are the basic characteristics of the present American-Chinese ties in the areas of science and technology?

#### Intergovernmental Contacts: The Initial Stage

American-Chinese scientific and technical ties have a short history: Their starting point could be considered the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, in which both states declared their desire to develop bilateral contacts through various channels, including the areas of science and technology.<sup>2</sup>

In the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC and a legal treaty to serve as the basis for scientific and technical ties, until 1979 contacts in these fields were developed on an unofficial basis, initiated by non-governmental organizations but with the silent consent and often the energetic assistance of both governments. These scientific and technical exchanges include those organized on the American side by the Committee for Scientific Exchanges with the PRC, founded in 1966 by three organizations (the National Academy of Sciences, the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies). To a much lesser degree, this work was also conducted by the National Committee for American-Chinese Relations and the National Council for the Promotion of American-Chinese Trade. All of these organizations enjoy the financial support of federal agencies and interact with them closely while retaining a certain degree of independence.

Another channel of intergovernmental scientific and technical ties was the exchange of official visits by delegations in 1972-1978. These delegations were generally made up of prominent scientists and specialists.

Since January 1979 the main legal document in this area has been the 5-year agreement between the governments of the United States and PRC on scientific and technical cooperation, signed during Deng Xiaoping's U.S. trip. The agreement states, in particular, that the principal areas of cooperation will be agriculture, power engineering, space research, public health, environmental protection, the earth sciences, and machine building. The exchange of scientific personnel is envisaged.

In accordance with Article 10 of this agreement, a joint committee on scientific and technical cooperation was created. Its functions include the planning, coordination and supervision of the development of scientific

cooperation between the two countries. The committee considers proposals regarding future activity in specific fields. Both countries have appointed "executive organizations": For the American side it is the Office of Scientific and Technical Policy, and for the Chinese side it is the State Committee for Science and Technology.

The American-Chinese agreement on scientific and technical cooperation stipulated that primary attention be given to the agreements that had been concluded in October-December 1978. They regulate contacts in three fields.

The first is the field of education. In accordance with an agreement concluded in October 1978, the Chinese side expressed a desire to send 500-700 undergraduate and post-graduate students and scholars to the United States in the 1978/79 academic year (the United States planned to send 60 students to the PRC between January and September 1979).<sup>3</sup> According to American forecasts, the total number of Chinese citizens attending American higher academic institutions will reach 3,000-5,000 in the early 1980's.

Agriculture was chosen as the second field. During U.S. Secretary of Agriculture R. Bergland's visit to the PRC in November 1978, an agreement was reached on the organization of cooperation in matters pertaining to agricultural technology, economic information and trade in agricultural products. It was also agreed that selection, biological weed control, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, agricultural education and management methods would be the areas of future informational exchange. An agreement was reached on cooperation in forestry, rural construction, the heightening of meadow and pasture productivity, the cultivation of fruit trees and medicinal plants, and the use of remote control and computers in agriculture. It is probable that future cooperation between the United States and the PRC in this field will not be limited to exchanges of delegations, but will also include joint research projects. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has promised to set up business contacts between Chinese state establishments and American corporations manufacturing agricultural machines and equipment. The department's decision to regularly send groups of experts to the PRC to determine the needs of Chinese agriculture that can be satisfied with American shipments is closely connected with this promise, aimed primarily at promoting the interests of U.S. agroindustrial corporations.

The third field mentioned in the 1978 agreements is space technology. The two sides agreed on the development of communication and broadcasting systems in the PRC. In particular, the Chinese leadership intends to buy all necessary equipment from the United States, including equipment required for the operation of satellites. NASA has been assigned the task of launching a satellite for China's future use. The Beijing leadership also plans to buy the necessary surface equipment from the United States for receiving information about natural resources from the American Landsat.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation, an agreement on cooperation in the field of high-energy physics was concluded by Washington and Beijing in January 1979. It envisages the development of bilateral cooperation in theoretical and experimental research, in the design and construction of accelerators and in matters pertaining to other technical problems. The basic forms of cooperation are the exchange of information on the results of research and experiments, joint research and engineering projects, and the exchange of scientists and specialists, models, materials, devices and components for testing and evaluation. The agreements will be in effect for 5 years from the time of their signing on 31 January 1979.

Beijing is paying more attention to the possibility of cooperation with the United States in nuclear engineering. Several delegations of Chinese nuclear engineers have visited the United States recently. Correspondingly, groups of American scientists have visited China. At present, the PRC is planning to build a proton accelerator for the Institute of High-Energy Physics with the assistance of the Enrico Fermi Laboratory of Berkeley University (the Americans have already consented to this plan). Washington is also prepared to allow the sale of Western European reactors with American components.<sup>5</sup>

A new series of four sectorial agreements on scientific and technical ties between Washington and Beijing was concluded at the time of U.S. Secretary of Commerce J. Kreps' visit to the PRC in May 1979. They include an agreement on cooperation in meteorology, envisaging joint research and weather forecasting with the use of computer equipment and artificial satellites. In accordance with this agreement, a meteorological station will be built in the PRC, radar and computer equipment from the United States will be installed there, and the maintenance staff will be trained by American specialists. The information received at this station will be used by both sides; it is supposed to "improve weather forecasting and commercial aviation services in both countries."<sup>6</sup>

The two sides agreed on the exchange of scientific information and contacts pertaining to the protection of the marine environment, the development of aquaculture and tunny fishing.

Another agreement was signed on cooperation in the area of measurements and standards. And, finally, the last of the agreements concluded during J. Kreps' visit was an agreement on cooperation in the management of science and technology and the exchange of technological information. This agreement, in addition to envisaging joint conferences and seminars on management, will give Beijing access to the resources of the National Technical Information Service of the United States.

The China visit of Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare J. Califano in June 1979 supplemented the legal basis even more and expanded the subject matter of American-Chinese contacts in the areas of science and

technology. The two sides signed a protocol on cooperation in medicine and public health, which envisages the exchange of specialists, delegations and scientific information and defines the basic areas of cooperation, particularly infectious and parasitic diseases, cancer, cardiovascular disorders, and public health systems.

In August 1979, while U.S. Vice-President W. Mondale was in China, an agreement was concluded on cooperation in the area of hydraulic power engineering. In accordance with this agreement, specialists from the U.S. Corps of Engineers, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Department of Energy and the Bureau of Reclamation will assist the PRC, on a commercial basis, in investigative work and the design and construction of several of the 20 hydroelectric power stations planned by Beijing. Joint experiments and research projects, the exchange of specialists and the training of technical personnel for the PRC are also envisaged. Judging by American estimates, joint efforts in power engineering could someday turn this area into the major field of American-Chinese scientific and technical relations.

The Beijing visits in January 1980 of U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown and, in particular, the President's adviser on scientific and technical affairs, F. Press, who attended a meeting of the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, were intended, to a certain extent, to stimulate the development of intergovernmental technological contacts. The impact of these measures was limited: Press' trip resulted in the official signing of a previously agreed upon memorandum concerning the sale of stations to China for the decoding of photographic data transmitted by Landsat, and two protocols regulating contacts in the field of the earth sciences.

An important part in the development of the organizational and legal basis for scientific and technical cooperation was played by the American-Chinese agreement on trade, which paved the way for the mass sale of modern equipment and technology to China, particularly in connection with the granting of most-favored-nation status to the PRC.

Without trying to diminish the significance of the extremely rapid appearance of the legal prerequisites for scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and the PRC, we must say that this still constitutes the main result of intergovernmental ties. The implementation of decisions is either just beginning or still in the discussion stage.

Washington's official line consists in encouraging scientific and technical contacts with the PRC in almost all areas, with the exception, as Washington maintains, of exclusively military fields. At the same time, as the WASHINGTON STAR reported in March 1980, during the China visits of Mondale (that is, long before the "Afghan events") and Secretary of Defense Brown, "the Carter Administration expressed its willingness to sell China military equipment that could not be used to destroy an enemy." In March 1980 the State Department officially authorized the shipment of "non-combat" military



equipment and technology to Beijing: radar devices, means of transport, communication systems and so forth.

In April 1980, Assistant Secretary of State R. Holbrooke confirmed the United States' willingness to satisfy China's demand for "non-combat" equipment in testimony before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives. Holbrooke also mentioned some of the conditions of this kind of transaction, which essentially proves that the United States will link the transmission of equipment and technology to the PRC in each specific case with Washington's current political interests. Besides this, the conditions of these shipments will guarantee, as R. Holbrooke put it, American control over China's mastery of this technology. The administration is actually encouraging the transmission of military technology, equipment and weapons from Western Europe to the PRC. Washington is not keeping Chinese emissaries from freely touring U.S. scientific centers. Specialists from the PRC have been accepted for long-term work assignments in some important American laboratories. Finally, American citizens of Chinese origin, who frequently visit the PRC, are quite often the employees of firms and university centers where they have immediate contact with the latest scientific and technical discoveries. In addition to all this, there are indications that the "pro-China wing" of the administration is quite deliberately engaging in the transmission of scientific and technical information, and sometimes even documents, through the secret channels existing between the CIA and Chinese intelligence.

An analysis of American-Chinese military-technical contacts cogently attests to Washington's desire to urge Beijing to continue the intensive development of military equipment and technology directly aimed against the Soviet Union and its friends and allies and inject an anti-Soviet purpose into the development of Chinese military equipment. At the same time, the willingness to aid in the reinforcement of Chinese military potential is obviously inconsistent with the administration's promise to consider the interests of America's allies located near the PRC.

#### Growth of Purchases of American Technology

After shipments of Soviet complete sets of equipment were cut sharply for obvious reasons, the PRC did not undertake any massive purchases for a long time. Within the framework of the "Great Leap Forward," Beijing virtually refused to import complete sets of equipment. In 1972 the purchases were resumed (orders were placed in the West) and acquired sizeable dimensions. In 1973-1975 the total cost of imported complete sets of equipment was almost 3 billion dollars, and most of this sum covered the purchase of plants for the production of artificial fertilizers and petrochemical enterprises.<sup>7</sup>

American corporations lost the battle for the Chinese market to their Western competitors, and this naturally disturbed them.

In particular, the U.S. share of total contracts for the shipment of complete sets of equipment to China was only 8 percent in 1972-1975, while Japan's share reached 45 percent, France had 21 percent of the market and the PRC had 15 percent.<sup>8</sup>

In 1978 Chinese purchases of complete sets of equipment rose to a record high; the total value of the contracts signed was almost 7 billion dollars. In accordance with the plan for Chinese economic development in 1979, imports of "new technology and complete sets of equipment" constituted around 25 percent of all Chinese imports.

This sharp increase in the cost of imports is partially a reflection of shipments made according to contracts signed in previous years. A new series of agreements on the acquisition of complete sets of equipment, however, is expected. These agreements will essentially be concentrated in such areas of production as electric power engineering, mining, oil production, transportation, petrochemicals, electronics and metallurgy. In particular, CIA experts have calculated that all of the contracts negotiated in 1979 could have amounted to more than 22 billion dollars in ferrous metallurgy, 6 billion in coal mining and the production of electric energy, and more than 4 billion in transportation. The completion of projects of greatest interest to Beijing is estimated at over 1.5 billion dollars in nonferrous metallurgy, up to 750 million in the construction industry and over 70 million in the machine tool industry. American experts believe that purchases of equipment worth many billions of dollars will be required for the prospecting, development and exploitation of oil and gas deposits (25-50 billion dollars).

American corporations are expected to be the main suppliers of equipment for the petroleum industry, certain types of electronic devices and machines for packaging materials manufacture and the export branches of Chinese industry. Despite the energetic efforts of the U.S. Government and monopolies to penetrate the Chinese market, however, the chief suppliers of the overwhelming majority of types of equipment will still be Japanese and Western European companies, which are eager to sell the PRC modern complete sets of equipment. In 1978 the total cost of American shipments of industrial and transport equipment, scientific instruments and control and measurement devices to the PRC was approximately 80 million dollars, and the proportion accounted for by these goods in total U.S. exports to China was below 10 percent.<sup>9</sup> Most of the Chinese purchases in the United States still consist of agricultural and industrial raw materials and foodstuffs.

Beijing is actively using purchases of American equipment to expand direct technological contacts with supplier corporations. In recent years, for example, there has been a rapid increase in the number of specialized seminars held in the PRC by U.S. corporations for specialists in various branches of industry and agriculture.

Contracts for shipments of equipment are generally accompanied by license agreements and the transmission of technical documents. During the

1971-1977 period the total cost of American licenses and technical information sold to the PRC was almost 400 million dollars, which exceeds the cost of American exports of machines and equipment to the PRC in the same years.<sup>10</sup>

Chinese organizations are also making energetic use of commercial contacts with American firms for the direct education of middle- and top-level technical personnel. In particular, between the beginning of 1973 and the end of 1977, around 400 Chinese specialists were trained by approximately 20 American firms supplying China with machines and equipment. These companies included Stewart & Stevenson, Geospace, Pullman, Kellogg, Caterpillar, Gleason, United Technologies, Hunter Engineering and Dowell.<sup>11</sup> American observers have noted that when contracts are being negotiated for the purchase of U.S. equipment, the Chinese side generally stipulates a longer than usual training period for its specialists.<sup>12</sup> In addition, the Chinese side usually requires experts from the supplier firm to come to China to train Chinese specialists and assist in the installation and adjustment of imported equipment.<sup>13</sup>

Therefore, American-Chinese scientific and technical contacts through commercial channels have been much more active in recent years. In spite of this, there have been more frequent discussions in American special literature of factors seriously limiting the possibilities of large-scale contacts with China through commercial channels. Some of them are indissolubly connected with the underdevelopment of the Chinese economy, science and technology.

The installation and operation of the new equipment requires sizeable capital investments, and here the possibilities of the Chinese economy are limited by the need for large capital investments in agriculture, transportation, power engineering, the military industry and so forth. The PRC national economy is "not ready," according to American experts, for a broad program of plant construction. The building material requirements of just ongoing capital construction, for example, exceed the capabilities of Chinese industry. According to estimates, China will import all of its cement in 1980 for the first time since the beginning of the 1950's. Imports from Japan just in 1979 were estimated at a minimum of 2 million tons for a sum of 120 million dollars. Ore will be imported from Australia or Brazil for the metallurgical plant being built near Shanghai because the poor quality of Chinese ore would require the construction of an enriching combine. What is more, the working of ore deposits in China would take, according to the estimates of American experts, around 7 years.

The PRC is now experiencing an obvious shortage of skilled scientific workers and engineering and technical personnel, necessary for the successful and rapid installation and exploitation of large quantities of modern equipment. The disintegration of the educational system and the repression of professional workers were the major cause of the present situation. As a result of the "Cultural Revolution," the Chinese national economy lost around 2 million potential graduates of higher academic institutions.



The shortage of skilled personnel and the necessary capital investments has already caused significant delays in the construction of many plants purchased abroad in the early 1970's (in some cases, the delay has been as long as 2 years), and some plants have never operated at planned capacity. Above all, this applies to 13 plants purchased in 1973 and 1974 for the production of artificial fertilizers, only 2 of which had been operating at projected capacity by spring 1979.

The system of strategic export control in the Western countries is also limiting the possibility of imports of the latest technology to a certain extent.

Finally, the main obstacle is the shortage of the financial resources China needs to pay for purchased equipment. Considering the limited export potential of the PRC, the acquisition of large Western loans and credit cannot solve this problem. To overcome these difficulties, American ruling circles are stressing the need to "open the door" to foreign direct private capital investments in the PRC economy on terms acceptable to potential investors. Joint companies are being advertised as the most effective way of acquiring advanced scientific, technical and administrative knowledge and equipment with no need for currency expenditures.

The Beijing leadership hastened to agree to these proposals. In July 1979 a special law was passed in China on joint enterprises with participation by Western capital.<sup>14</sup>

In fall 1979 a special company was founded in Beijing to handle foreign credit and investments. Its chief functions consist in studying the possibilities for the formation of joint enterprises, establishing contacts with foreign firms, clarifying projects and establishing these enterprises. In addition to performing the functions of a middleman, it will oversee the activities of these enterprises and promote their further development.

The first official agreement concluded by this company with a foreign partner was the 3-year contract signed in fall 1979 with an investment firm, Inton-Shen Pacific Corporation (San Francisco), envisaging the investment of American private capital totaling 150 million dollars in Chinese industry.<sup>15</sup>

There are doubts in the United States about the prospects of this kind of move, however, stemming from a lack of confidence in the domestic political stability of China, as well as factors connected with the underdevelopment of the Chinese economy, science and technology--the lack of development in the infrastructure, the limited possibility of supplies of raw materials and semimanufactured products from Chinese sources, the low level of manpower skills and so forth.

There are significant differences between the American and Chinese approaches to matters pertaining to technological contacts. These differences, in turn, are the reason for present and potential conflicts and friction in the development of these relations.

One sign of the dissimilar interests--and, in the case of several important matters, the contradictory aims--of the United States and China was the extremely heated battle in U.S. ruling circles over the exact areas and scales of technological cooperation with China, as well as arguments over the age and quality of the technology which could be made available to Beijing. Several influential politicians and scientists are arguing against the transmission of some of the latest types of scientific and technical information, particularly in the military sphere. They include, for example, Senator A. Cranston, Congressman L. Wolff, who is the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and prominent political and scientific spokesmen G. Kennan, R. Scalapino, J. Steinbruner, W. Kintner, D. Barnett and others. The well-known political scientist R. Clough said recently that there is no unanimity even within the Carter Administration itself in regard to the development of relations with China,<sup>16</sup> and in January 1980 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked that "latent hostility" within the Washington Administration "could flare up once again over the question of the extent to which U.S. relations with China should be expanded and the speed with which this should be done."

In reference to the plans for technological cooperation that cropped up in January 1980 during H. Brown's visit to China, H. Harding, renowned expert from Stanford University, stresses that these contacts could be much more dangerous than beneficial for the United States.<sup>17</sup> In response to the intense pro-China campaign organized by certain circles, L. Wolff announced in January 1980 that he was definitely against any radical shift in the direction of cooperation with Beijing.

It should be borne in mind, of course, that quite definite and often multiple motives lie behind such extremely realistic statements. Whereas, for example, W. Kintner sympathizes, in his book "A Matter of Two Chinas," with the fears of China's neighboring states in connection with the possibility that Beijing will be supplied with strategic technology,<sup>18</sup> Congressman J. Rousselot wonders how Beijing will treat the United States "after it has acquired and mastered the technology it needs." G. Kennan and D. Barnett have pointed out the possible negative effect of the scientific and technical assistance of Beijing in strategic areas on Soviet-American relations. It is indicative that these statements are being made in the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism created by U.S. reactionary circles.

The selfish intrigues of Washington strategists are aimed at the attainment of mutually exclusive goals. These are attempts to manipulate Beijing's behavior in the international arena and the desire to preserve the PRC's backwardness in the more advanced fields of scientific and technical knowledge and guard, by some unknown means, the United States' Asian allies against the Chinese threat. What is more, Washington's attempts to convince the American public that Beijing's military-strategic plans have an exclusively anti-Soviet purpose and allegedly do not threaten U.S. security are obviously based on dubious assumptions. This was reaffirmed in May of this year, when China conducted tests in the South Pacific on an intercontinental ballistic missile carrier capable of reaching U.S. territory.

Carried away by anti-Sovietism, the advocates of the maximum development of contacts with the PRC for purposes contrary to the interests of peace and public security are now trying to abate existing conflicts and depict them as secondary matters which cannot undermine mutual interests. If we soberly assess the potential for scientific and technical contacts between the United States and China, however, we can expect these conflicts to be considerably exacerbated in the near future.

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[Article by D. Ye. Furman]

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## AFTER THE PRIMARIES

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pp 49-52

[Article by O. N. Anichkin]

[Text] After the so-called primary elections in the American campaign were over, it was time for the national party conventions.

The Democrats have pledged the incumbent President J. Carter the necessary majority of convention delegate votes to confirm his candidacy for the presidency.

The primaries brought victory to Republican R. Reagan, who had no serious rivals and thereby guaranteed his nomination at the convention of his party in Detroit.

The majority of political correspondents are explaining Carter's extremely favorable campaign situation as primarily a result of the events in Iran. He skillfully campaigned without, so to speak, ever leaving the White House. The chauvinistic hysteria over the problem of freeing the American hostages raised him to the crest of the campaign wave. Carter was even able to minimize his "campaign expenditures" after the failure of an extremely dangerous adventure--the landing of commandos in Iran for the purpose of freeing the hostages by force. The "average American" supported the President and even expressed sympathy for him. But this reflected a desire for "national unity at a time of crisis" more than a rise in Carter's prestige. This is a common phenomenon in the United States under circumstances of this kind. For the majority of Americans the President is a symbol of order and authority. In connection with this, we could recall what J. Kennedy said after the failure of the intervention against Cuba in the Bay of Pigs: "The worse I act, the more popular I am." Approximately the same thing is going on now.

It is no wonder that so many observers perceived elements of campaign tactics in Carter's behavior in the "Iranian situation." As TIME magazine reported, one senator said, after a talk held in the State Department to

determine the causes of the failure of the landing operation: It is disturbing that political--that is, campaign--considerations can be seen in Carter's decision to carry out the operation in Iran, and "the entire story has too many political nuances." In his opinion, "it is not likely that any politician would take this kind of risk if he were not seeking reelection to the presidency."

Despite the extremely favorable outcome of the primaries for J. Carter, his chief rival within the Democratic Party, Senator E. Kennedy, declined Carter's proposal to "unite efforts to defeat the Republics" and intends to continue his work for the nomination directly at the party convention. Kennedy's expectations are mainly built on a recent noticeable change in the atmosphere in the United States: The authority and popularity of J. Carter as the President are suffering another decline. Kennedy's supporters have concluded from this that the Democratic convention delegates who support Carter will change their minds and will not vote for him at the convention. The Kennedy camp has organized a movement within the Democratic Party for a revision of the rules governing the election of delegates and defining their obligations. They hope that many delegates will abandon Carter if the proper changes can be made in this rules, and then Kennedy's supporters will be able to secure his nomination.

The Kennedy supporters feel that these plans are far from groundless. For example, they cite the results of some public opinion polls which predict that Carter will be defeated by R. Reagan on election day. For this reason, they say, the nomination of the incumbent President as the Democratic Party candidate at the convention will cause the party to lose the White House in advance. The Kennedy camp is stressing the senator's victories in the primaries in the largest states of the union (New York, California, New Jersey, Massachusetts and others), the voters of which could play the deciding role in the presidential elections. Furthermore, Kennedy's supporters are arguing that most of his victories were won at the end of the primary election period--that is, at a time when the mood of the voters changed as a result of rapidly changing conditions in the nation.

It has been predicted, however, that Kennedy's supporters will encounter major difficulties in the attempt to change existing party rules for the purpose of relieving delegates of the obligation to vote for a previously stipulated candidate. This has been attempted several times in the past, but with no results. This time as well, when the Democratic campaign platform was being drafted prior to the convention, Kennedy supporters tried to change the rules governing the obligations of delegates in the balloting on the nomination. But this was a futile effort.

The analysis of an ABC television correspondent is of definite interest: "Regardless of Kennedy's final decision, he feels that he cannot simply withdraw from the race and support Jimmy Carter. If he does this, he will lose the trust of labor leaders, political activists, the people who solicited contributions for his campaign and the voters who supported him this



year.... Kennedy believes that he does not have to make a definite decision now and can wait awhile. Even if Carter should be forced to make concessions in regard to the platform and even if the convention rules are changed in such a way that delegates will be relieved of the obligation to vote for a specific candidate and will be able to vote according to their conscience, Kennedy will still encounter difficulties because there will be more Carter supporters than Kennedy supporters at the convention. Kennedy could hurt his political future. Evidently, his chances are dubious."

The primaries also proved that E. Kennedy is extremely vulnerable on what could be called the personal level. In particular, the Chappaquiddick incident has not been forgotten.

On the whole, the results of the primaries testify that there is clear opposition within the Democratic Party to Senator Kennedy and his closest associates at this time. Regardless of who the Democratic presidential candidate will be, observers have predicted that inner turmoil will still exist within the party, will harm it and will lose it votes in the presidential elections. It is no wonder that Democratic Party leaders are already indirectly accusing Kennedy of endangering party unity.

As for the Republicans, they are already engaged in the active preparation of their campaign strategy. Their leader, R. Reagan, obviously expects to win the election. For example, he has recently expressed more restrained views: He has departed from the stereotypes that are employed more frequently by politicians than by statesmen. To some degree, this is attested to by some of his remarks about the SALT II Treaty.

Political observers in the United States, just as in other countries, are making note of the paradoxical nature of the campaign. The American voter apparently has to make a choice between two clearly unpopular candidates. When Republican Congressman J. Anderson, who is running in the election as an independent candidate, described these individuals, he said that Carter is a man who "demonstrated a total inability to formulate clear policy filled with common sense" in his capacity as President, and that Reagan is a politician whose future is "too closely bound up with his past."

The "Anderson phenomenon" is arousing widespread interest in political analysis circles, although he was not successful as a Republican Party candidate in the primaries. John Anderson, who was once a career diplomat, has been elected to the House of Representatives from a district in the state of Illinois for many years now. He once held extremely rightist views, but these changed radically after the events of 1968, when Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were assassinated and the entire nation was engulfed by racial conflicts. He, according to the weekly TIME, was stunned by these events and seriously wondered for the first time about the reasons for the "profound social unrest" in the United States.

Anderson expects to win the election. "We," he says, "are living in a strange time, a time of the most diverse and extraordinary trends, and this

is why I have a chance of winning." He has no intention of disrupting the two-party system. In his words, the United States now has "a party and a half," and the nation needs "two strong centrist parties." Anderson gathers large crowds at rallies and is receiving sufficient contributions from various sources. He hopes to take advantage of the fact that around 35 percent of the American voters call themselves "independents" and that this number is rising with each election.

The appearance of an independent candidate in the campaign arena is equally disturbing to the Democrats and the Republicans. Anderson could take votes away from the candidates of both parties. This could be the deciding factor, since neither Carter nor Reagan, judging by all indications, has a clear majority.

During the primaries all of the defects of the American political system manifested themselves clearly. It is this system that has allowed authority in the nation to be actually usurped by the proteges of the two bourgeois parties, within which the nomination of candidates for the presidency depends on financial status and on campaign maneuvers behind the scenes. In particular, as the press has noted, the present occupant of the White House did not balk at the latter either. Using his official status as President and leader of the Democratic Party, he exerted pressure on party leaders in the states where his position was weak.

According to analysts, Carter has been able to avoid public discussions of the nation's pressing internal problems and the failures of the administration's foreign policy line. He has skillfully manipulated public opinion and has diverted the voters' attention away from existing urgent problems to artificial international crises created by American diplomacy and the Pentagon.

All of these factors have contributed to the growth of disillusionment in the voting public. The voters are more convinced than ever that candidates who are prepared to make generous promises but are incapable of solving the nation's urgent problems are being "palmed off" on them. "The voters are not inspired by any of the present candidates. The primaries ended in an atmosphere of gloomy discontent," TIME magazine comments.

"Why do so many Americans feel disillusioned and dissatisfied?"--the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS asks. Citing public opinion polls, the newspaper concludes that the majority of voters feel that both Carter and Reagan are "unacceptable candidates" for the presidency. A UPI correspondent remarked in this connection that if the voters could say "no" to both candidates in the November election, the chair of the White House occupant would be vacant for the next 4 years.

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QUEBEC SAYS 'NO'

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[Article by N. B. Bantsekin]

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**THE MIAMI EVENTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES**

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**[Article by S. A. Chervonnaya]**

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## AMERICAN PEACE WORKERS VISIT THE SOVIET UNION

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[Article by S. A. Karaganov]

[Text] A delegation of American supporters of peace recently visited the Soviet Union. The delegation was made up of the following members: Frank Rosen, head of the delegation, co-chairman of the American Peace Council and director of a district committee of the electricians union; Chockie Goddard, vice-chairman of the council and director of the American Indian Center in San Francisco; Ed Vargas, vice-chairman of the council and vice president of the Connecticut State Teachers Federation; Tony Mullaney, member of the coordinating council of Mobilization for Survival, a Catholic priest and a Boston college instructor; Michael Clark, Baptist minister and director of the Project Disarmament program set forth by New York's famous Riverside Church; Jean Curley Bond, one of the editors of FREEDOM WAYS, the magazine of the black intelligentsia; Damu Smith, representative of the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers); Pauline Solomon, member of the Boston Peace Council; C. T. Vivian, director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, instructor and Baptist minister; James Renfrew, member of the executive committee of Concerned Clergy and Laymen.

The composition of the delegation and the stories related by its members provided some idea of the present objectives of American fighters for peace.

The movement which erupted in the United States in the 1960's and early 1970's to protest the disgraceful U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia was one of the reasons the American military establishment had to get out of Vietnam. After this, however, the movement suffered a noticeable decline. It even appeared that it had completely ceased to exist after it had attained its main and primary goal. The bourgeois mass media tried to convey this impression by covering up the activities of American supporters of peace. Nonetheless, religious, pacifist, youth, labor and women's organizations continued to take part in the peace movement. Their goal was and is the prevention of a new U.S. slip in the direction of aggression. They are fighting against the arms race. In the second half of the 1970's the voices

of American supporters of peace were heard quite distinctly when they protested the attempts of the administration and militaristic circles to force the neutron bomb on the world and develop new strategic armament systems, particularly the B-1 bomber.

The establishment of the American Peace Council in November 1978 at a conference in Chicago considerably strengthened the movement. Local preparatory committees were then set up in states. An organizational convention of the council was held in Philadelphia in November 1979 and represented an extremely important stage in the development of the American peace movement.

The main purpose of the convention was to draft a general platform to unite all organizations, regardless of the specific goals of each (some groups are concerned with only one aspect of council activity--for instance, the fight against racism and against Washington's actual support of the apartheid regime in South Africa--and are not striving to take part in, for example, the fight against the arms race). The unification of American fighters for peace is also being impeded by considerable differences in the political and ideological views of the groups and organizations making up the movement--from leftist radicals to religious pacifists.

The convention in Chicago set extremely broad objectives for the council and the organizations making it up. They included the resistance of the plans of NATO and the Pentagon to begin a new round in the race for strategic weapons, and further struggle for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. A resolution on the Middle East condemned the Camp David agreements and demanded recognition of the legitimate right of Palestinian Arabs to establish their own state. The convention also condemned the "dangerous militaristic atmosphere" connected with the American-Iranian conflict and warned the U.S. Government against any attempts to use this conflict as a pretext for military intervention. The decisions of the convention appealed for recognition of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea and for the lifting of the embargo on trade with Cuba. In connection with all of these and many other issues, the Peace Council and many of the organizations it more or less unites are conducting energetic explanatory work through the mass media, and the movement's activists are speaking at various gatherings and organizing demonstrations and protest rallies.

The objective of establishing a broad network of committees for the conversion of defense production to peaceful industry is high on the long list of the council's goals.

The American Peace Council is working closely with the World Peace Council and with national peace organizations in other countries.

Contacts have also been established with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. It was at this committee's invitation that the American

Peace Council formed a delegation of American supporters of the peace movement and sent them to the Soviet Union. The delegation visited Moscow, Tashkent and Samarkand and had numerous talks with Soviet supporters of peace--scientists, journalists, statesmen and representatives of the Moslem, Orthodox and Baptist churches. The members of the delegation took a lively interest in all aspects of life in our nation, our people and the Soviet Union's position in international affairs, and discussed the problems facing American fighters for peace.

The sharp exacerbation of the international situation and the escalation of anti-Soviet and chauvinistic feelings, which began in 1979, the delegates said, have complicated the extremely energetic activities of peace organizations in recent years. In spite of this, however, peace-loving forces in the United States are continuing their struggle.

One of the distinctive features of the U.S. peace movement, delegation members pointed out, is that the majority of the organizations making it up hope to prohibit the use of atomic energy for any purpose--peaceful as well as military.<sup>1</sup> This attitude is quite widespread in the United States and became even stronger after the well-known accident at the nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. After this accident, extremely broad segments of the American public joined the movement for "denuclearization" and it became nationwide. Peace organizations are trying to involve all people who are worried about the possible effects of the development of nuclear power engineering on the environment and on human health in the general struggle to limit and ban nuclear weapons. Special attention is being paid to the connection that may exist between the sale of reactors and fuel for them and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While the representatives of the American peace movement were in the USSR, they stressed in meetings, talks and speeches that the movement opposing the aggressive policy of American imperialism is gaining strength in the United States, that people on the other side of the ocean are also striving for peace, and that many of them are actively working toward this goal.

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1. Obviously, far from all of the people involved in the international peace movement share this view. Many are well aware of the need for the "peaceful atom," but only if its use is thoroughly and strictly controlled.



## ECONOMIC 'AID' AND NEOCOLONIALISM

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[Article by R. I. Zimenkov]

[Text] Economic "aid" to the developing countries is known to occupy a prominent place in the arsenal of U.S. foreign economic weapons. The United States is making a great effort to influence socioeconomic and political processes in these countries and to control the process of the reorganization of international economic relations.

Today the United States and other imperialist states do not expect, as they once did, to "perpetuate" the backwardness of developing countries by keeping them in the position of agrarian and raw material appendages. They have realized that these expectations are unrealistic and that they must contribute in some way to the development of the productive forces of these states, but in such a way as to intensify the development of dependent capitalism in the liberated countries and to involve them even deeply in international capitalist division of labor through integration within the framework of the worldwide capitalist system.

In order to carry out these plans, the U.S. Government is taking advantage of the socioeconomic differences of the developing countries and certain conflicts between them, is employing a selective approach to them and is trying to strengthen ties with exploitative classes. The most varied means of economic pressure are being used. As a means of expansion, aid is much more directly related than other instruments of neocolonialism to the general goals of U.S. foreign policy.

### Goal-Oriented Planning

The United States realizes the vital importance of preserving the institution of aid as one instrument of international politics. Its class purpose is obvious. As V. I. Lenin wrote, "the development of capitalism in young countries is considerably accelerated by the example and aid of older countries."<sup>1</sup> By means of billion-dollar grants, the United States is trying to assist in the birth of "free capitalism" in the developing countries.

The United States is the largest financial "donor" in the capitalist world. Its economic aid to the developing countries amounted to an average of 4-4.5 billion dollars in the 1970's, and reached 5.1 billion in 1979, exceeding the total aid of any other developed capitalist state (see Table 1). Nonetheless, throughout the 1970's its share in the total aid of the developed capitalist states gradually decreased--from 39 percent in 1971 to 25 percent in 1979.<sup>2</sup> The proportion accounted for by this aid in the American gross national product is also decreasing--from 0.31 percent in 1971 to 0.22 percent in 1979. This means that the United States is not fulfilling the obligations it took on at the third session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Santiago (1972) concerning the allocation of 0.7 percent of its GNP to the developing countries in the form of preferential loans.<sup>3</sup> In terms of this indicator, the United States was in 14th place among the 17 states making up the OECD committee on aid to the developing countries in 1979.

During the last decade the real value of the aid has also decreased in connection with inflation and the declining exchange rate of the dollar. Just between 1970 and 1974 the decrease was equivalent to 33.8 percent,<sup>4</sup> and the figure exceeded 60 percent by the end of the 1970's. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, in the mid-1970's the United States annually spent 6 times as much on the production of alcoholic beverages and 17 times as much on military needs as on aid to the developing countries.

As a result, real economic aid was at its lowest level at the end of the 1970's in comparison to the beginning of the 1960's.

Along with the relative decrease in total economic aid to the developing countries, the effectiveness of this aid was reduced noticeably, and this, according to American analysts, was largely due to the headlong rush by foreign economic agency heads to attain immediate political goals, to the desire of some corporations and bourgeois groups to derive immediate benefits to the detriment of long-range strategic interests, and to the awkwardness of the foreign aid mechanism.

Regarding aid as one of the most important political instruments in relations with the developing countries, the U.S. Administration decided in the mid-1970's to revise the entire system of American economic aid with a view to enhancing its effectiveness while minimizing expenditures and attaining greater political benefits, including long-range advantages. For this purpose, Washington made a number of adjustments which did not change the essence of policy but were intended to modernize its forms and methods.

The principal change took the form of a gradual transfer of state loans and credit from a bilateral to a multilateral basis. Emphasis was placed on more active participation by such organizations as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), regional development banks and others. Annual U.S. contributions to these organizations more than tripled between 1970 and 1978 and reached 1.2 billion

dollars. In 1978 U.S. aid offered through international financial institutions was equivalent to 30 percent of all foreign aid, as opposed to 19 percent in 1968.<sup>5</sup> Washington began to energetically work toward an increase in the funds provided by international organizations and other developed capitalist countries. As a result, during the annual IBRD session in Nairobi (September 1973), 25 developed capitalist countries agreed to contribute 4.5 billion dollars to the IDA in 1975-1977. Japan's share of total contributions rose from 5.9 to 11 percent, the FRG's share rose from 9.6 to 11.4 percent, and the U.S. share decreased correspondingly from 40 to 33.3 percent.

Table 1

Economic Aid to the Developing Countries,  
in millions of dollars

Forms of aid	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Economic*	3668	4908	3878	5591	5238
Loans	1386	1678	1759	2083	--
Grants	2282	3230	2119	3508	--
Through the IDA	1877	2519	2333	3178	3011
Loans	807	809	857	1348	--
Grants	1070	1710	1476	1830	--
To safeguard security	503	1226	1127	1766	2241
Through "Food for Peace" program	1136	1328	1301	1193	1300
Dollar sales	485	868	902	735	--
Local currency sales	226	--	--	--	--
Gifts	425	461	399	458	--
Other	655	1061	244	1220	927
Including contributions to international organizations	480	784	24	931	--

\* The data in the table represent foreign aid commitments, and not actual expenditures.

Calculated according to: "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, 1 July 1945-30 September 1977. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979," Hearings, Wash., 1978.

Within the bounds of this new policy, particular attention is being given to countries that have accumulated sizeable currency reserves in dollars. These are primarily the oil-exporting countries. The President's foreign economic report of February 1974 stressed the need to use the potential of these countries as well for "concerted effort" in international development. It is known that the OPEC countries gave the developing states 17.1 billion dollars between 1972 and 1978, including 8.3 billion through international organizations.<sup>6</sup> Due to the low developmental level of their productive forces, however, the oil-exporting countries are unable to provide the

developing countries with the machines and equipment they need. This is why the funds they allocate for aid are used to purchase equipment and technology in the United States and in other developed capitalist countries. Frightened by the threat of the catastrophic consequences of the increasing foreign debt of some developing countries, private banks in the developed capitalist states, particularly the leading U.S. banks, were already demanding in the beginning of 1976 that a special fund be created as part of the IMF to guarantee the payment of the developing countries' debts by providing the means to cover their balance of payment deficits.

This fund, which was called the Witteveen Fund after a former IMF director, was created in 1977 with total assets of 10 billion dollars. It is made up of contributions from the United States and Saudi Arabia (30 percent each), IMF funds (25 percent), and contributions from Kuwait, the FRG, Japan, Switzerland and Holland (15 percent).<sup>7</sup> The fund has become an important instrument for influencing the economy of the developing countries because credit is extended on the condition that the countries applying for loans conduct a policy of "economic stabilization" in accordance with the IMF program--that is, primarily by reducing subsidization of the state sector and cutting expenditures on social programs. The charter of the new fund also states that credit should be extended with a view to the "political situation."

Naturally, the United States has not abandoned its attempts to strengthen its own position in the developing countries on a bilateral basis. But now these efforts are directed, much more than ever before, at the reinforcement of U.S. positions in the particular economic branches in the liberated countries whose development will be in the long-range interests of American capital. A major trend in U.S. economic aid policy in the second half of the 1970's was the rechanneling of funds from the construction of industrial facilities and the infrastructure to the expansion of agricultural production for the resolution of the food problem and the development of rural regions, which, in Washington's opinion, will contribute to some degree not only to the "more just distribution of the blessings" of economic development, but also the formation of "middle strata" and the alleviation of social antagonism.

Economic aid on a bilateral basis is now offered in line with the doctrine of "new directions." Its basic premises were set forth in the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and 1975. The new approach consists in the depiction of aid as something intended to satisfy "basic human needs"--food, shelter, medical treatment, education and work.

The Middle Eastern countries were becoming the leading recipients of U.S. aid at the end of the 1970's. These countries' share of total American economic aid rose from 20 percent in 1971 to 41.6 percent in 1979. The chief recipients among these countries are Egypt and Israel. At present Egypt is the leading recipient, ahead of even Israel. In 1979 the United States gave this country 956.7 million dollars, which considerably exceeds

all of the assistance given to all of the African and Latin American countries combined. Another leading recipient is Israel, which was allocated 790 million dollars in 1979. After the Camp David agreements were signed, the United States promised to considerably increase total aid to these countries.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, the share of the Asian countries has decreased perceptibly--from 32 percent in 1971 to 17.7 percent in 1979. This is connected with the termination of aid to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The African countries' share of total U.S. aid rose slightly in these years, reaching 11 percent, which was due to increased U.S. interest in the countries of the Dark Continent. The leading recipients of aid in Africa are Ghana, Zaire, Zambia and Kenya.

The proportion accounted for by the Latin American countries in total U.S. economic aid dropped from 18 percent to 7 percent between 1971 and 1979, and this was connected with the termination of aid to some countries of this continent which had reached a certain level of economic development (the largest recipients of aid include Bolivia, Haiti, Peru and Honduras). An increase in American direct private capital investments, in terms of which Latin America leads the developing countries, is "compensating" for the reduction of aid to the Latin American countries.

The increased U.S. interest in the least developed of the developing countries is one of the important changes in foreign aid policy. The increased aid to these states is largely due to the U.S. desire to prevent the explosive exacerbation of social conflicts in this group of countries. Besides this, the abrupt growth of the balance of payment deficits of several of the least developed countries after 1973, their reduced ability to purchase industrial goods from the United States and their united action in the world arena have forced the United States to change its policy in regard to the distribution of funds. Whereas in 1972 the allocations of the Agency for International Development (AID), the chief U.S. Government organization concerned with aspects of economic assistance, for these purposes amounted to 7 percent, expenses had risen to 74 percent in 1978.<sup>9</sup>

In the 1970's there was some relaxation of foreign aid conditions, which was reflected in the gradual replacement of loans with grants. Whereas, for example, loans represented 46.8 percent of all aid to the developing countries in 1965 and grants represented 53.2 percent, the respective figures in 1978 were 35 percent and 65 percent. The high percentage of grants is due to the huge amounts of nonrefundable aid allocated to reactionary regimes and the United States' military allies.

In accordance with the "new directions" in foreign aid policy, the sectorial structure of this aid also changed substantially. From 1973 on, most of the aid for development sent to the developing countries from the United States was earmarked for agricultural development and the maintenance of birth control, public health, education and occupational training programs. The amount of AID allocations for these purposes doubled between 1971 and 1979, amounting in 1979 to 75 percent of the total foreign assistance appropriations of this agency.<sup>10</sup>



The concentration of attention on increased agricultural assistance (in 1979 AID allocations for the development of this branch of the economy totaled 673 million dollars, or around 50 percent of all agency appropriations for economic aid) is due to the fact that the resolution of the agrarian problem is closely related to socioeconomic and structural changes in the developing countries. The socioeconomic future of these countries and the balance of political power, which will ultimately affect their future development, largely depend on the resolution of this problem. Under these conditions the United States is striving to direct the development of agrarian relations into capitalist channels. Efforts are being made to spread the achievements of the "green revolution" since it is regarded by U.S. ruling circles as an alternative to social reform in rural areas and as a means of resolving social conflicts with the aid of technical progress. Besides this, the offer of agricultural assistance inevitably broadens American exports of agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers, grain, etc.

Increased assistance in the field of birth control is also indicative--from 20.3 million dollars in 1968 to 205.4 million in 1979. Numerous channels of American propaganda and pressure have been used to convince the developing countries that rapid population growth will complicate their economic development. It has been formally acknowledged that birth control is an internal voluntary affair and cannot be an official condition for the receipt of American aid. In fact, however, countries must assign priority to the population problem if they wish to receive this aid.

The emphasis on increased scientific and technical assistance in U.S. foreign economic policy is striking. Expenditures on this type of assistance doubled between 1971 and 1979, reaching 482 million dollars. As President J. Carter stated when he was in Venezuela in March 1978, scientific and technical assistance is becoming an increasingly important element of the U.S. foreign aid program.

It must be said, however, that definite changes took place in technological aid policy in the second half of the 1970's. Under the pressure of the developing countries, the United States began to send them the means to establish their own scientific and technical infrastructure, to give some assistance to regional technology transmission centers and to aid in the use of American space equipment, the development of water resources and the exploration and utilization of the world ocean. To adapt modern technology to the needs of these countries, the United States proposed the creation of several international research centers, as well as the expansion of the existing network of research organizations engaged in the study of agriculture, public health and education. At the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, held in Vienna in August 1979, the United States announced its intention to create a new government organization to give scientific and technical assistance to the developing countries--the Institute for Technical Cooperation.<sup>11</sup> This organization will work on projects of interest to the United States and the developing countries, but will continue to emphasize research in the fields of agriculture, public health

and education, as well as the investigation of such global problems as power engineering, the development of natural resources and environmental protection.

Striving for more effective foreign aid programs,<sup>12</sup> which are being carried out by many American government agencies and public organizations in addition to the AID, the U.S. Government is making an effort to coordinate programs of assistance and government reorganization more closely. In the second half of the 1970's, for example, the structure of the AID underwent significant changes: Several departments and offices were eliminated, which reduced the number of personnel and increased the administrative responsibilities of management on the middle level; the decision-making process became more decentralized, as a result of which its missions in the developing countries were given more authority; the AID perfected its programming methods and procedures and began to use allocations for operational needs more efficiently.<sup>13</sup>

In a message to Congress on 7 March 1979, President J. Carter proposed the creation of a new organization--an agency for cooperation in international development--for the more effective coordination of foreign aid programs with other measures taken by the U.S. Administration in the area of foreign economic policy in the developing countries. The chief purpose of this organization consists in the coordination of foreign aid programs on the bilateral level and through international organizations, the elaboration of a single economic policy in regard to the developing countries, and the establishment of control over the budget of agencies in charge of economic assistance.<sup>14</sup>

The agency for cooperation in international development will be made up of the AID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (the functions of which consist in insuring American private investments abroad and guaranteeing investments) and the Institute for Technological Cooperation, which investigates problems in scientific research and the use of technological achievements in the developing countries. The director of this agency will be under the immediate jurisdiction of the President and the U.S. secretary of state and will be their chief adviser on foreign economic policy in relations with the developing countries.

#### Means of State Export Stimulation

Now that the balance of payments is becoming increasingly crucial and currency and financial difficulties are multiplying, the United States is actively using foreign aid to stimulate domestic economic development through foreign trade. American statistics testify that government expenditures on economic aid create an opportunity for the annual use of an additional 2.5-3.4 billion dollars for the economic development of the United States. These funds, sent to foreign states as aid, permit the United States to make fuller use of production capacities in industry, agriculture and the infrastructure. In this connection, a statement made

by Secretary of State C. Vance on 30 March 1979 is indicative: "By supporting the economic growth of the developing countries, our foreign aid programs are contributing to our own prosperity."

This feature of the foreign aid policy is largely due to the connection between foreign aid and the market of the donor nation. The demand to spend loans on the purchase of exclusively American commodities makes U.S. credit increasingly burdensome to the debtors, depriving them of the chance to use all of the benefits of international division of labor and the chance to buy commodities at the best price. Often the prices of machines and equipment acquired in the United States by the recipients of American aid exceed world prices by 50-70 percent. Moreover, the recipient is forced to buy not the best models available in the world market, but only equipment produced in the United States, regardless of its quality.

As early as the dawn of imperialism's development, V. I. Lenin wrote that, by using capital exports to intensify commodity exports, financial capital "is killing two birds with one stone: First of all, it is deriving profits from the loan and, secondly, it is deriving profits from the same loan when the loan is used to pay for commodities."<sup>15</sup>

The linking of funds allocated in foreign aid programs with the need to purchase costly American goods has aroused widespread criticism among the countries receiving the aid. Under the pressure of the developing countries the U.S. Administration announced its decision to liberalize the terms of aid in 1973 and allowed countries receiving this aid to use half the funds for the purchase of goods and services in the markets of third countries. Nonetheless, most of the loans extended by the AID are still being used to purchase American goods. For example, whereas in 1972 the proportion of goods purchased in the United States with foreign assistance funds was 95 percent, the figure was 85 percent in 1978.<sup>16</sup> Of the total quantity of goods acquired by the AID between 1970 and 1978 for a sum of 7.8 billion dollars, the amount purchased in the United States cost 7.1 billion while orders from other countries amounted to 700 million. It must be borne in mind, however, that many of the orders placed abroad were filled by overseas branches of American corporations.

As a rule, the leading place in AID shipments is occupied by American goods with low competitive potential. These include products of the steel industry, agricultural fertilizers, railroad equipment, etc. In some years programs of aid to the developing countries have absorbed up to 60 percent of all exported fertilizers, 40 percent of the products of the steel industry and 30 percent of all railroad equipment. Between 1961 and 1977, for example, the AID financed the purchase of products of the U.S. steel industry worth 351.6 million dollars.<sup>17</sup> On the whole, American statistics list more than 30 types of industrial products whose production and sales are financed to one degree or another by the government through foreign aid programs. This means that government funding of foreign aid shipments is an important factor guaranteeing the expansion of exports of U.S. industrial

products to the developing countries and keeping these exports on a high level.

American government funds allocated for food assistance also represent an important channel for the subsidization of U.S. exports of agricultural goods and foodstuffs. This was the purpose of "Act 480," which was passed in 1954 and which still serves as the basis for a special government program called "Food for Peace."

Within the framework of this law, 781 million dollars' worth of food was shipped in 1971, and 1.131 million dollars' worth was exported in 1978.<sup>18</sup> But this was not merely a change in the total quantity of shipments. It is indicative that all sections of the law underwent serious changes in the 1970's, attesting to the stricter terms imposed on food assistance and to a departure from the initial goals of the program.

Whereas the shipments made in accordance with this act in the 1950's and 1960's were generally paid for with the local currency of the recipient countries, in 1973 this became impossible. Long-term credit in dollars or another convertible currency became virtually the only way of receiving foodstuffs from the United States. The terms of these shipments began to approximate the terms of free market trade. In 1978 these shipments were made to 29 developing countries for a total sum of 794 million dollars.

That same year, free shipments represented 22 percent of all foodstuffs delivered and were made primarily on a bilateral basis through charitable organizations. Whereas in 1972 these shipments totaled 2.6 million tons, in 1978 the figure was only 1.2 million. It is important to note that they have taken on an increasingly overt political nature. These shipments are connected with the support of U.S.-approved reactionary regimes and with the demand for military-political and economic concessions from the recipient countries.

When the significance of "Act 480" as a unique way of subsidizing and encouraging exports of agricultural goods is assessed, it must be borne in mind that total shipments made according to this act between 1954 and 1978 amounted to 27.8 billion dollars, or around 12 percent of all agricultural exports. In reference to the benefits derived by American corporations from U.S. participation in international organizations, Secretary of State C. Vance said the following in a statement in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress on 1 May 1978: "Our economy still comes out ahead because the dollars we spend on foreign aid are used to buy goods and services here (the United States--R. Z.). For each dollar we have paid out to such organizations as the IBRD and regional development banks in Latin America, Asia and Africa, approximately 2 dollars have been spent in the American economy."<sup>19</sup> This means that U.S. aid to foreign states through international organizations (the annual total in the second half of the 1970's was around 1-1.5 billion dollars) is becoming an important source of funding for shipments of American goods, gaining increasing importance among all forms of government support of U.S. export expansion.



## The Further Politicization of Aid

The difficulties encountered by the United States in the international arena have forced it to use aid more and more openly as an instrument of foreign policy. It is being used to openly support reactionary regimes and governments willing to follow in the wake of American policy; it is also being used to bribe ruling circles and to strengthen the influence of pro-American circles in the developing countries.

Incidents attesting to the use of American aid as a means of exerting pressure on the young national states, as well as for the direct support of dictatorial regimes, have become increasingly numerous. It is a well-known fact that the United States responded to the nationalization of American enterprises and banks in Chile during the period of the Popular Unity Government (1970-1973) by cutting off aid. In 1975 aid to Uganda was cut off in connection with the nationalization of the property of some American companies. In March 1979 the United States announced sharp cuts in economic aid to Afghanistan in connection with the revolutionary socio-economic reforms being carried out in this country, and in 1980 this aid was completely terminated.

Here are some examples of a different type. After Egyptian President A. Sadat declared an "open door" policy and, in particular, after the Camp David agreements were signed, the United States sharply increased aid to Egypt. A change of policy in Somalia was followed by the immediate resumption of aid to this country by the U.S. Government. In connection with the Afghan events, the United States announced its intention to considerably increase economic aid to Pakistan.

American food assistance is acquiring more distinct political features. It is known that the U.S. Administration took the side of Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 and stopped sending food to India. Sri Lanka was "penalized" in the same way for the nationalization of U.S. oil companies. Food shipments to the starving population of Bangladesh were held up when this country sold some jute to Cuba. The United States refused to sell wheat to Chile for cash when the Popular Unity Government was in power, but a month after the coup it sold Chile wheat on credit on preferential terms.

Many such examples could be cited. But it is not simply that their number and their overtly political nature are growing. The distinctive feature of the second half of the 1970's was the U.S. move from isolated measures in this area to the implementation of a planned strategy, based on the constantly more intensive use of economic aid as an instrument of political pressure.

It was indicative that a special department was created within the U.S. State Department in January 1976 to analyze the results of the voting of developing countries in the United Nations. On the basis of its recommendations, decisions are made regarding aid to foreign states. In 1976, for



example, the U.S. Government decided to cut off aid to Tanzania after it voted in favor of the UN resolution condemning zionism and after it expressed its disagreement with the U.S. stand on the Korean question. At the same time, the program of aid to the governments of the Ivory Coast, Zaire and some other countries which supported the American position in the United Nations was substantially augmented.

The present administration's decision to convey the impression of an objective approach to foreign aid by making it conditional upon the observance of human rights also deserves mention. For this purpose, an interdepartmental group on human rights and aid to foreign states was created in April 1977. Its recommendations have had a substantial effect on the policy of rendering assistance both on the bilateral level and through international organizations.<sup>20</sup> This government organization, headed by the under secretary of state, is made up of representatives of the State Department, the AID, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, the National Security Council and several other federal agencies. The facts show that this organization uses the so-called double standard in conducting the policy of "protecting human rights," basing its recommendations regarding aid to various developing countries on military and political considerations. As a rule, the list of recipients compiled with a view to the recommendations of the interdepartmental group specifies countries which, according to American standards, observe human rights.

In some cases, the American Government has conceded to world and American public opinion and terminated or restricted aid to some states. In 1977, for example, it held up the extension of two loans to Chile on the grounds that civil rights were being violated in this country, and postponed the signing of agreements on food assistance with 28 countries, including South Korea, Indonesia and Bangladesh, "until such time as their position can be clarified" on the observance of human rights.<sup>21</sup>

These moves are propagandistic in nature. The United States is actually still giving economic assistance to countries in which it has a political or economic interest, regardless of the extent of their democratization. According to the findings of a private study, between 1973 and 1977 the countries with the most authoritarian regimes received 2.1 billion dollars in economic aid from the United States, and this did not include loans from the Export-Import Bank.<sup>22</sup> In 1979 the leading recipients of economic aid included South Korea, Israel, Haiti, Chile and Paraguay--countries with the most repressive regimes.

These examples, just as many others, reaffirm the inconsistency and hypocrisy of U.S. policy in the area of human rights.

Therefore, the new elements of U.S. policy regarding economic aid to the developing countries testify that imperialism is striving to adapt to a new and unfavorable situation in which it is losing its former monopoly positions. These elements are not making any fundamental changes in the

essence of foreign aid and its political purpose; they are merely intended to modernize its forms and methods. American economic aid is still being used primarily for pragmatic purposes--to solve domestic political problems in the United States--although selfish economic considerations have not been forgotten either. The neocolonial course is contrary to the national interests of the developing countries, which are in favor of the reorganization of international economic relations on a democratic and just basis, and is helping to exacerbate the conflicts between the United States and the liberated states even more.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 3, p 490.
2. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1979, August 1979, p 157.
3. See I. Ivanov, "The Economic Policy of Neocolonialism," MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 10, 1978.
4. "Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriation Bill 1977," 94th Congress, pt II, Wash., p 136.
5. "Science and Technology for Development," Wash., 1979, p 20.
6. THE OECD OBSERVER, July 1979, p 26.
7. INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN, 11 April 1977.
8. See Ye. Primakov, "Some of the Problems of the Developing Countries," KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1978.
9. "Development Issues. U.S. Actions Affecting the Development of Low-Income Countries," Wash., 1978, p 49.
10. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979," 95th Congress, pt II, Wash., 1978, p 637.
11. "Science and Technology for Development," p 22.
12. According to the American system of classification, programs of aid are subdivided into economic aid, scientific and technical assistance, aid connected with the "Food for Peace" program, assistance in safeguarding security, etc.
13. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, April 1978, p 27.
14. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, 12 March 1979, Wash., p 395.

15. V. I. Lenin, *Op. cit.*, vol 27, p 414.
16. BUSINESS AMERICA, 26 March 1979, p 5.
17. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979," pt IV, Wash., 1978, p 113.
18. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1979, p 77.
19. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, June 1978, p 14.
20. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1979," p 430.
21. WASHINGTON POST, 26 November 1977.
22. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 August 1977.

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## LAWLESSNESS LEGITIMIZED?

Moscow SSRA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 74-77

[Article by A. G. Tikhonova]

[Text] The Carter Administration's move in the direction of cold war is seriously alarming the American public, partially in connection with the prospects for the development of the government's domestic policy line. Under these conditions, the danger of a new reactionary attack on progressive forces and on the democratic rights of Americans is growing. It is not surprising that more frequent mention of the McCarthy era can be found in the American press, mention of the "American Dark Ages," that dismal time in the history of this country when rabid anticommunism in foreign policy was accompanied by frenzied reaction within the nation and the mass-scale suppression of democratic freedoms. Democratic circles in the United States are now demanding the prevention of a return to the past, the safeguarding of the constitutional rights of millions of Americans and the cessation of lawlessness and the abuse of power by the authorities.

There is particular concern over the fate of the previously planned reform of the intelligence community, the main purpose of which was declared to be the establishment of "stricter control" over the FBI and CIA and the "clarification of the prerogatives" of these and other intelligence and investigative bodies.

The question of the need for limitations of this kind arose in the mid-1970's, when many of the secret operations of the "intelligence community" were made public. Under public pressure, the administration and the Congress promised to reorganize the structure of intelligence bodies and limit their powers. The promise to conduct a reform of these agencies was widely used by J. Carter in his 1976 campaign, when he assured the voters that his policy on this matter would differ fundamentally from the policy of preceding administrations and that he would "put an end to lawlessness."

These assurances, just as many of J. Carter's other campaign promises, turned out to be meaningless statements. Time showed that the limitation

of abuses of power was not even being envisaged; moreover, the reform is now being used for completely opposite purposes, for the legitimization of past "violations" and the justification of future abuses by special services. This is eloquently attested to by the draft FBI charter recently submitted to Congress and now being widely discussed in the American press.

A special issue of the weekly NATION contains a critical analysis of the provisions of the FBI charter.<sup>1</sup> The discussion organized by the magazine was joined by prominent American figures, including Director John Shattuck of the American Civil Liberties Union, Director Morton Halperin of the Center for National Security Studies, former U.S. Attorney General R. Clark, Yale University law Professor T. Emerson, FOREIGN POLICY editor S. Unger, Director M. Churchill of California's Urban Policy Research Institute and A. Neier, professor of law at New York University and member of the editorial board of THE NATION.

An editorial preceding the discussion stresses the immediate need to solve the problem of the "governance of our secret police." The weekly states that the constant postponement of action to correct the situation will cost the American society too much.

The participants in the discussion recognize the need to draft legal standards to limit the activities of the secret police, which could act with virtual impunity throughout the almost 50-year "era" of FBI Director Hoover. But they note that the people for the adoption of these standards are pursuing far from identical goals. M. Churchill writes, for example, that many of the complaints about the absence of special legislation on FBI activity stem from the obvious regret of certain circles that there are no legal standards justifying its actions, which should be described as "lying and spying."

How will the draft charter "correct" this situation? The participants in the discussion primarily stress the fact that the text of this bill is the product of "15 months of intense effort by FBI Director Webster and Department of Justice heads." At a time when "various political forces who place draconian law enforcement above democratic values are fearful of any limitations upon police operations and the intelligence community itself is even more opposed to any kind of control," Professor T. Emerson remarks, "it seems strange, to say the least, that the task of drafting the bill would be delegated to the FBI, the very agency to be brought under control." This naturally predetermines the nature of all provisions in the draft, which, according to R. Clark, proves once again "how far America is from total commitment to the idea of freedom." For example, the charter ignores the main consideration--the American public's demand for effective oversight of FBI actions by society. Clark is still insisting on the creation of a federal police review commission, made up of representatives of the public, to investigate civilian complaints of FBI wrongdoing.

Several provisions of the charter, participants in the discussion note, authorize such "technical methods of surveillance" as the use of informants



and surreptitious electronic and mail surveillance; the law will give the FBI access to the private confidential information of banks, credit institutions, insurance companies and so forth. In this way, the most outrageous violations of the constitutional rights of Americans will acquire legal status.

How is the public demand to limit FBI investigative activity to criminal cases and prohibit the investigation of political activity reflected in the charter? It is known that the bureau spends huge amounts not so much to combat crime in the nation as to keep an eye on dissident Americans. The draft contains a provision prohibiting surveillance for "political and religious views expressed in lawful ways" (Paragraph 531 "a"). As M. Churchill points out, however, the charter also gives the FBI the right to collect information "concerning an actual or threatened civil disorder" or "relating to a peaceful demonstration."

Other sections of the charter actually delegate "national political police" functions to the FBI. In particular, this applies to the paragraph authorizing institutions and organizations to request the FBI for information about job applicants. Professor A. Neier cites figures attesting to the scales of this sphere of FBI activity: "At last report, the FBI was providing an average of 16,000 reports, or about 4 million a year." What is more, when the FBI provides information about involvement in criminal actions, it also sends out arrest records and conviction records, even if the persons convicted are later acquitted of criminal charges. This leads to a situation in which millions of people, including those arrested by accident, are in danger of losing their jobs and joining the ranks of the unemployed at any time. Considering the fact that this practice is creating a hopeless situation for many Americans and is inducing the unemployed to violate the law--that is, it carries the potential threat of a rise in the crime rate--A. Neier feels that the FBI "might be regarded as part of the problem of crime, not as part of the solution."

It is even more significant, however, that this section of the charter authorizes the FBI to act as a "national clearing house," with the political views of citizens serving as the chief criterion for hiring purposes: After all, the charter will legalize the old FBI practice of regularly providing employers with information about the reliability of their employees. This provision is directed primarily against communists and individuals with leftist convictions.

The participants in the discussion make special mention of the paragraph of the charter which authorizes the FBI to investigate "terrorist activity." Many of them are convinced that the broad interpretation of this extremely vague term could be quite dangerous, as it could easily be used to resume the mass-scale attacks on the democratic movement in the United States.

As early as March 1978, FBI Director W. Webster said in congressional hearings that "an internal intelligence division of the bureau has been

instructed to investigate groups and movement suspected of terrorist leanings."<sup>2</sup> The present charter provision regarding the investigation of "terrorist activity," the journal stresses, will legitimize the situation in which any legal organization can become the object of surveillance on the pretext of its imaginary terrorist "leanings" (or suspected "sympathies").

Prominent American Civil Liberties Union spokesman F. Donner has written that the FBI is trying to interpret terrorism as a political phenomenon having some kind of connection with the "communist conspiracy." This is not a new strategy. "For many years intelligence bodies," Donner remarks, "have depicted terrorism or violence as the latest variety of communism."<sup>3</sup>

Assessing the draft FBI charter, the participants in the discussion unanimously conclude that it contradicts the public demand for an end to the old tradition of "government lawlessness." "This charter will use the letter of the law to approve police practices and abuses developed over the years that are irreconcilable with the ideas of democracy," R. Clark points out. According to T. Emerson, this draft charter falls into the category of bills that are worse than nothing.

Churchill expresses her thoughts even more distinctly: "If this charter is approved, the FBI will have sanctions for practices which should be thought illegal and amoral." The writers of the charter, this author ironically states, proceeded from a principle which, rephrasing the well-known remark by Voltaire, could be formulated as "if there are no laws justifying FBI actions, they must be invented."

The American press is also still analyzing Washington's "new line" in regard to the Central Intelligence Agency. When CIA abuses were exposed in 1974 and 1975, the question of the resolute cessation of these abuses arose, but today the authorities are working on a new problem--how to strengthen the position of American intelligence. Carter's statement in his State of the Union Message to Congress (23 January 1980) regarding the need to "cancel unjustified restrictions on our ability to collect intelligence data" was supported by the same circles that have recently made numerous appeals for the "unfettering" and "unshackling" of the CIA.

The largely formal limitations on CIA activity which were imposed at the end of the 1970's are now being harshly criticized in conservative circles. They are inclined to blame the fallen "prestige" of the CIA within the nation and abroad on errors in judgment on the part of Congress and the administration. Former Assistant CIA Director Ray Cline made the following statement after the failure of American intelligence efforts in Iran in December 1979: "The Iranian crisis tragically illuminates the present inferior status of the system of U.S. central intelligence bodies. In the last 5 years the harsh remarks of the mass media, criticism in the Congress and the harmful limitations imposed on the CIA by Carter and Mondale have catastrophically diminished our ability to conduct covert intelligence operations abroad."<sup>4</sup> People in these circles are alleging that the passage

of the law on the inviolability of private life and the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (on the basis of which the public acquired partial access to secret information pertaining to the illegal activities of the FBI and CIA) have supposedly "mutilated" the entire system of U.S. security.

These hypocritical remarks are completely inconsistent with the facts. The "harmful" limitations did not in any way keep the CIA from continuing its abusive and lawless practices. In recent congressional testimony, for example, CIA Director S. Turner admitted that, despite the official ban instituted in 1977 on the use of journalists, clergymen and professors as spies, he had countermanded this provision "in some cases." According to Turner, "certain circumstances can justify the use of these individuals,"<sup>5</sup> acting under the cover of their official status.

As we know, the CIA is officially prohibited from engaging in political assassinations, but the same S. Turner said in a TIME magazine interview that the President could always be persuaded to "remove" someone if it were in a "good cause."<sup>6</sup>

The criticism of conservative circles has had a significant effect on J. Carter's position. For Carter, according to an opinion expressed in the press, opposition to CIA abuses no longer seems a "profitable political sport." The draft CIA charter recently submitted to Congress after prolonged debates is also a concession to conservative circles. The above-mentioned Director Morton Halperin of the Center for National Security Studies says that the "draft charter will not in any way further the President's announced goal--the prevention of abuses of power." Just as the draft FBI charter, the draft CIA charter sanctions the surveillance of American citizens, phone tapping, the covert entry of private homes and the installation of listening devices there, and such "less flagrant" methods as the infiltration of public organizations by agents, the use of members of these organizations as informants, the covert scrutinization of their documents and so forth. "The combination of all this," M. Halperin concludes, "takes in all past abuses, but it legitimizes them instead of prohibiting them."<sup>7</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

1. THE NATION, 6 October 1979.
2. Ibid., 20 May 1978, p 592.
3. Ibid.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 December 1979.
5. Ibid., 2 March 1980.
6. TIME, 6 February 1978.
7. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 27 March 1980.

THE WASHINGTON PAY-OFF

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 78-92

[Third installment of translation by A. A. Arzumanov of chapters from the book "The Washington Pay-Off; A Lobbyist's Own Story of Corruption in Government" by Robert N. Winter-Berger, New York, 1972, Lyle Stuart, Inc.]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE ALASKA OIL PIPELINE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

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pp 93-99

[Article by Yu. M. Feygin]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### SALT II Ratification Debates

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 100-102

[Review by V. F. Valeriyev and S. A. Kulikov of the book "Arms Control and SALT II" by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1979, 75 pages]

[Text] Many works on arms control have been published in the United States in connection with the signing of the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty. As a rule, they concentrate on a comparative analysis of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strength, the technical calculation of the quantity and quality of nuclear missile systems, the prospects of military planning, the elaboration of military doctrine, negotiation tactics and so forth. The significance of arms control for "national security" is often only mentioned in passing in this literature, but there is an abundance of arguments substantiating the need to preserve the United States' "position of strength" in nuclear matters.

These problems are examined from another standpoint by W. Panofsky, a prominent Stanford University physicist who has regularly served on the American President's advisory groups on disarmament since the 1950's. In his opinion the American society is still viewing nuclear weapons as a symbol of strength and an indicator of the nation's status in the world and, for this reason, is incapable of soberly assessing the catastrophic nature of the consequences of a nuclear conflict and of assigning priority to arms control over other aspects of policy in the area of national security. Panofsky feels that American scientists are obligated to make a maximum effort to dispel the "nuclear lethargy" accompanying the dangerous and senseless arms race in the United States. This is the purpose of his book.

The urgent need for nuclear arms control, according to Panofsky, is stipulated by one simple fact: Deadly potential has been accumulated in the world, consisting of 30,000 nuclear devices, each of which has a yield considerably exceeding the force of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. "The total destructive force of nuclear weapons can now be compared only to cosmic forces. It would be difficult to even imagine the diversity of global consequences for mankind and the ecology if much of this nuclear arsenal should be detonated" (p 5). Panofsky shares the view of several prominent American scientists that the existence of such huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction is a "disgrace for contemporary civilization."

Despite the obvious threat nuclear weapons pose to all mankind, however, some people in the United States still believe that precisely this type of weapon is an effective political instrument in dealings with other countries. Various military doctrines--"massive retaliation," "flexible response" and "limited nuclear war"--unequivocally propose the use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. What is more, work in the development of new types of nuclear weapons is aimed at maximizing the possibility of their actual use. Panofsky harshly criticizes the American experts and politicians who allege that the neutron bomb, as a qualitatively "new" weapon, can be "successfully" used in conventional military operations and supposedly will not escalate nuclear conflicts. Panofsky directs attention to the fact that American officials who proclaim military-political doctrines deliberately fail to point out that the chief victims of a nuclear conflict will be the civilian population, and not the armed forces.

The development of the military strategy pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons is escalating the race for nuclear arms, and this can only be stopped if there is no official justification for the creation of new nuclear missile systems. "It is obvious that until such time as absolute priority is assigned to the prevention of nuclear war...as opposed to the ability to wage and win such a war, it is not likely that the stockpiling of nuclear weapons will cease" (p 12).

The mere discussion of the "irrationality" of using nuclear weapons is not enough to stop the arms race. Consistent measures of control are also needed, and their chief objective must be disarmament. In connection with this, Panofsky notes the futility of the attempts to link agreements with the Soviet Union on SALT with matters totally unrelated to this. "It is important to realize that arms control agreements are not a reward for 'good behavior,' they are not an expression of trust and they are not the result of common ideological goals. The agreements are a means of diminishing the threat to survival in the nuclear age" (p 15).

The attempts of the military-industrial complex and Pentagon to acquire funds for "more advanced" nuclear missile systems as compensation for the support of control agreements could turn the very cause of nuclear disarmament into a farce. The tactic of using weapons as "trump cards" in negotiations could also lead to this. The spirit of strategic rivalry, which has been carried over to the level of bilateral control talks, and the political ruses used to deceive the other side cannot contribute to effective disarmament agreements, the author stresses.

Panofsky is particularly disturbed by the political manipulation of the results of SALT agreements to prove the "weakness or strength" of America, which has nothing in common with the actual assessment of the relative military strength of the United States and USSR. "The debates over who is ahead and who is behind are not productive and lead...only to demagoguery" (pp 23-24). The discussion of the SALT II treaty in the United States has become a vivid example of how the very purpose of the agreements can be distorted.

Panofsky has no doubt that the SALT I agreement and SALT II treaty have increased U.S. and Soviet security, that they prove the possibility of preventing an uncontrolled race for nuclear arms and, consequently, that they will diminish the risk of nuclear catastrophe. It is true that the control measures agreed upon thus far have not stopped the arms race. From this standpoint, "there is little reason for the enthusiastic approval of the achievements of SALT II." However, in Panofsky's opinion, despite the insignificant effect of SALT II on the further deployment of nuclear missile systems in the United States, the treaty has become a "huge political problem" of disproportionate significance. As a result, the present debates in the United States have little relation to the essence of the SALT II treaty.

The matters being discussed primarily concern alternatives in the development of Soviet-American relations, and past and future U.S. decisions in the spheres of military and foreign policy. "Can the Russians be trusted? Does the signing of SALT signify approval of Soviet behavior and ideology? How can we approve a SALT treaty signed by an administration which has canceled the production of the strategic B-1 bomber and shelved the neutron bomb? Have we not disarmed enough already? Not one of these questions," Panofsky states, "is pertinent to the criticism of SALT.... The merits of SALT must be determined by the answer to one single question: Has U.S. security increased or decreased as a result of SALT? The answer to this question is unconditionally affirmative" (p 52).

The political struggle that broke out over these issues overshadowed the actual meaning of the SALT II treaty and put its ratification by Congress in question. What is more, all opposition to the treaty united forces, "unable to accept the fact that the United States...can no longer control the world as it did decades ago" (p 53).

Describing the tactics of the "hawks," who allege that American security has been weakened by the treaty, Panofsky says that their reasoning, which is based on selective indicators of the comparative nuclear strength of the United States and USSR, cannot be convincing because all systems of weapons must be taken into account in the evaluation of the real balance of power. Here the situation is such that "regardless of these indicators, regardless of whether the SALT II treaty goes into effect or not, at least in the coming decade, each side will have to consider the prospect of retaliatory destruction if it should undertake a first nuclear strike" (p 55). But the SALT debates have become a "convenient pretext" for those who want to promote new nuclear missile systems.

Analyzing the critical remarks of the opponents of the SALT II treaty about the individual points of the document, Panofsky sarcastically points out the absurdity and irrelevance of their arguments. For example, they often imply that the treaty cannot eliminate the "strategic vulnerability" of the stationary Minuteman missiles, although it is obvious that this could not have been one of the objectives of the Soviet-American talks. Moreover, the very problem of the vulnerability of missile systems is facing the USSR as much as the United States. The thesis that the administration performed an "act of unilateral disarmament" when it refused to build the B-1 bomber seems absolutely ridiculous. According to Panofsky, the President's decision to substitute more effective cruise missiles for the B-1 "made the very task of arms control extremely complicated," and this cannot be interpreted as any kind of step toward disarmament (p 58). The SALT II treaty is being heaped with criticism because it does not mention the Soviet "Backfire" bomber, although it is obvious that if it had been included in the text, the United States would also have had to include its own forward-basing systems located in Europe. The opponents of the treaty allege that its enactment will weaken U.S. military obligations to NATO allies, but they do not mention that these allies fully support the U.S.-Soviet agreement (pp 59-61).

Panofsky is firmly convinced that the debates in the United States over the SALT II treaty, in which questions of political and military rivalry with the USSR are prominent, have moved far afield from the discussion of the main purpose of the treaty--control over the race for nuclear arms, which will be the main factor determining the security and survival in a nuclear age of all mankind, and not only the United States. "The SALT process is the only course that gives us hope that the senseless accumulation of nuclear weapons...can be limited and reversed" (p 63).

#### American Use of Japanese Experience

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 102-104

[Review by A. N. Panov of the book "Japan as Number One. Lessons for America" by E. F. Vogel, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1979, XI + 272 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

#### Hollywood Version of U.S. History

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 105-107

[Review by I. Ye. Kokarev of the book "American History, American Film. Interpreting the Hollywood Images," edited by John E. O'Connor and Martin A. Jackson, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1979, XXIX + 290 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

## Capitalist Currency Problems

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 107-108

[Review by B. A. Zhebrak of the book "Krizis sovremennoy valyutnoy sistemy kapitalizma i burzhuaznaya politicheskaya ekonomiya" (The Crisis of the Contemporary Capitalist Currency System and Bourgeois Political Economy) by D. V. Smyslov, Moscow, Nauka, 1979, 423 pages]

[Text] In this book, D. V. Smyslov discusses problems that have aroused the interest of many economists in various nations for a long time. This is the group of problems connected with the currency relations of today's capitalist states. In essence, this monograph is the most complete Soviet work on this matter to date. It covers the period from the 1930's to the present.

Analyzing the mechanism of the Bretton Woods capitalist currency system that has developed in the postwar years, the author cogently proves that it is a natural and determining stage in the evolution of the financial relations of capitalist countries, corresponding to a specific stage in the development of the capitalist method of production.

The system of the gold currency standard, established by the Bretton Woods agreement, reduced the dependence of worldwide capitalist trade and production on the limited gold base and thereby aided in the elimination of trade and currency restrictions in the West in the first years after the war, and has somewhat stimulated the development of industrial production and foreign trade in the capitalist countries. This stimulation took place when the connection between the issuance of paper money and gold reserves was broken, allowing these countries to expand total demand regardless of the state of their balance of payments. For example, the negative balance of payments of the United States, whose monetary unit was used as the main currency reserve, did not automatically reduce the total amount of money in circulation, decrease purchasing power in the nation, restrict credit, etc. In turn, additional sums of national monetary units were circulated in countries with a positive balance of payments that kept their currency reserves in dollars and pounds sterling without exchanging them for gold. The gold currency standard stimulated the expansion of demand in this way but it also created inflationary tendencies and, in view of the fixed exchange rates and conversion potential of currency, served as a channel for the transmission of inflation from some countries to others.

The main defect of the Bretton Woods system, however, was its reinforcement of the special role of a national currency--the American dollar (and, in part, the pound sterling)--as the principal international reserve medium and a kind of currency standard.

Analyzing the deterioration of U.S. currency conditions in comparison to those of other capitalist countries, the author quite correctly notes that



this deterioration was the result of huge currency expenditures by the United States abroad (military spending, the export of capital and so forth) and the drop in the competitive potential of American goods, which weakened the U.S. position in international trade. As a result, U.S. imports of goods in 1971 exceeded exports for the first time in this century, and the deficit in the balance of trade totaled 2.3 billion dollars (p 121).

One of the merits of the work being reviewed is the author's thorough analysis of international currency reform tendencies in the West. The author discusses the decisions adopted at the International Monetary Fund session in Kingston (Jamaica) in 1976, which played an important role in the subsequent fate of the capitalist currency system.

Discussing the role of gold, the author stresses that, despite the decisions made in Kingston regarding its demonetization, the withdrawal of the yellow metal from international circulation has been a slow and contradictory process (p 314).

As for special drawing rights (SDR), the author correctly views these as the "embryo of a supranational reserve-credit monetary unit" (p 332). With the institutions of the SDR, "the conditions of credit operations in international transactions began to be determined, for the first time in the world capitalist system, not by the arbitrary behavior of private individuals and financial institutions in individual countries, but by an international agreement uniting the capitalist states" (Ibid.). At the same time, the author stresses the need for international payments in a medium which, as a product of labor, would represent a physical indicator of value (p 326).

Smyslov's work is distinguished by a thorough analysis of the views of contemporary bourgeois economists on world currency problems and the effect of these beliefs on the decisions made by national and international currency agencies.

Analyzing the currency mechanism created by the decisions of the Kingston IMF session, the author stresses that the present currency reform is only a half-way measure. For this reason, it can be said with complete justification that the process of the reorganization of the capitalist currency and financial mechanism will take many years and will be accompanied by new conflicts and upheavals.

## American Military Strategy

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 108-109

[Review by Yu. K. Krasnov of the book "SShA: voyenno-strategicheskiye kontseptsii" (The United States: Military-Strategic Concepts), editor-in-chief R. G. Bogdanov, M. A. Mil'shteyn and L. S. Semeyko, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 303 pages]

[Text] Another collective work by Soviet scientists on the theoretical arsenal of American policy has been published. Despite the fact that it is the latest in a long list of works on the same subject and that several of the problems it discusses have already been elucidated to some degree in our literature, the new book is important because its authors analyze large quantities of the latest information.

The authors reveal the sociopolitical and ideological bases of military-strategic thinking in the United States and trace the relationship between theoretical premises and the class interests of ruling circles.

There is no question that one of the strong points of the work is the authors' successful attempt to demonstrate the connection between military strategies and economics, military doctrine and politics. This is all the more important since the improvement of contemporary types of weapons and the shifting balance of power in the international arena have brought about substantial changes in the role of these factors during the elaboration of military doctrine.

The extensive list of institutions, projects and groups operating within the U.S. system for the engineering of military policy and strategy is extremely useful, as is the analysis of methodological approaches to the development of military-strategic concepts.

In our opinion, two of the authors' conclusions are quite convincing and could serve as a general criterion in the study of American military-strategic concepts. The first pertains to the creation of a diversified system of scientific establishments in the United States after World War II which are involved in the engineering of military policy and strategy. The "scientific guarantee" is now an integral part of the entire mechanism for the engineering of military-political strategy and military-strategic planning in the United States, and the relative significance of research and analytical elements within this mechanism is now quite impressive. The common characteristics of the "scientific" part of the mechanism are excessive pluralism, structural fragmentation, a tendency toward technicism (that is, toward the examination of primarily military-technical matters with little regard for sociopolitical issues) and the dominant role of military agencies in the funding and organization of strategic research and the use of research findings (p 96).

The second conclusion is the authors' response to attempts by American ideologists and theorists to give their bourgeois concepts an objective and scientific appearance. In reality, as the authors correctly point out, they are distinguished by unadorned political tendentiousness. It is as if objective strategic analysis is used to justify the continuation of the arms race, preparations for major and minor wars, and indulgence in military blackmail and threats. Despite the tremendous amount of strategic research conducted in the United States in the last 35 years, this quantity has not evolved into quality. The failures of American military policy in the 1960's and 1970's graphically demonstrated the futility of thousands of strategic studies. American military theorists have not been able to elaborate a strategy that could be unanimously accepted in U.S. ruling circles as a rational method of using military force under present conditions.

The authors' analysis of the specific content of various theories and the connection between foreign and military policy is interesting. The slanderous lies about the "Soviet military threat" are also conclusively exposed in the book.

#### Capitalist Economic Regulation

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 109-110

[Review by Yu. G. Kondrat'yev of the book "Inflyatsiya i krizis regulirovaniya ekonomiki" (Inflation and the Crisis of Economic Regulation) by S. M. Men'shikov, Moscow, Nysl', 1979, 366 pages]

[Text] The new work by this author represents a further step in the comprehensive study of cyclical problems, inflation and state economic regulation in the capitalist countries. In essence, this is a book about the very functioning of the capitalist economic system with all its inherent contradictions.

The main factors affecting the modification of the economic cycle's workings are analyzed in depth by S. M. Men'shikov. In his opinion, they include internal structural changes in the economies of the capitalist countries: changes in the organizational structure, primarily the growing role of private monopolies and the state; changes in the technological structure, connected with the present technological revolution and the peculiar forms it has taken in the capitalist economy; changes in the correlation of social class forces--a qualitatively new stage in the development of the conflict between the highly organized working class and private monopolistic capital supported by the state.

The contrast between capitalism's scientific and technical achievements and its inconsistency in the resolution of major economic and social problems is striking in the current stage of the general crisis of capitalism. On the basis of abundant factual material, the author examines the effect of

technical progress on the process of capitalist reproduction. In his opinion, the rate of technological progress displayed a tendency toward deceleration in the capitalist countries in the 1970's, and this increased the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations.

A prominent place in the work is devoted to the discussion of the capitalist state's role in cyclical reproduction, primarily in the ebb and flow of postwar cycles. The author conclusively proves that anticyclical regulation has played a relatively insignificant role as a means of preventing and alleviating crises. In the final analysis, the traditional policy of anti-crisis regulation has not prevented the intensification of crises; what is more, it has contributed to the development of inflationary processes.

The author's comprehensive approach to the examination of inflation gives him scope to discuss such complex problems of the present day as monopolistic competition and pricing, the new conditions of the struggle of the working class and the bourgeoisie for the distribution of national income, the effect of state-monopoly regulation of the economy in general and the cycle in particular on the level and dynamics of prices, and the role of the present modified system of monetary circulation in the inflationary process.

The book contains thorough scientific criticism of bourgeois theories of inflation, with consideration for the changes these theories are undergoing today.

The place of inflation in the contemporary cycle is discussed in detail. The author notes that the "tendencies governing the cyclical movement of prices have changed considerably," and the crises of the 1970's have already taken place under the conditions of a significant inflationary price leap (p 248). Explaining the reasons for this, the author stresses that "the capitalist economy, given its present structure, will inevitably relive the phenomenon of stagflation" (p 282).

The work contains a thorough and profound study of the effects of further inflation on the capitalist economy. The author's conclusion is unequivocal: Stagflation in the future could considerably increase the severity of periodic crises and other disruptions of capitalist reproduction and, consequently, represent one of the most dangerous phenomena for contemporary capitalism.

The problem of limiting inflation has become a primary objective of state-monopoly regulation. At the same time, the author proves the futility of attempts by bourgeois scientists and statesmen to curb the inflationary rise in prices. The birth of the stagflation mechanism has imposed even greater restrictions on the active use of traditional methods of combating inflation, and has even made this use impossible due to the absolute contradiction between the anticrisis measures of the bourgeois state and the

measures of anti-inflation policy. Existing recipes for government regulation, as the author demonstrates, are inconsistent with the complex and contradictory nature of actual conditions, now that the simultaneous existence of inflation and unemployment, declining demand and rising prices is possible. Under the conditions of monopoly domination, S. M. Men'shikov writes, no radical reorganization of state-monopoly regulation can be expected.

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CSO: 1803



IMPERIALIST CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 111-118

[Article by V. I. Ovsyannikov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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## AIRCRAFT-CARRIER DIPLOMACY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 80  
pp 119-127

[Article by G. M. Sturua]

[Text] Recent events have shown that the United States is once again protecting its imperialist interests by openly relying on military force. The U.S. Navy has been assigned the functions of the main striking force in the implementation of this line. This is attested to above all by the actions Washington has taken in recent months in the Near and Middle East.

In the beginning of May, a fleet of 37 American warships was located in the waters of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The fleet included four aircraft carriers, with up to 350 planes on board, capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The total number of U.S. servicemen in this main attack force was 34,000, including 1,800 Marines.

Official representatives of the U.S. Government and military command have openly discussed the many alternatives offered by this concentration of naval forces near Iran: from the landing of Marine units and the organization of a naval blockade to the bombing of Tehran, Qom, Kharq island, where Iran's largest oil port is located, and facilities of the petroleum and petroleum refining industry.

According to U.S. advocates of naval strength, recent events, including the American-Iranian conflict, have simply confirmed that naval forces have no equal among other types of armed forces in the direct support of American foreign policy, and it is aircraft carriers that represent the nucleus of the navy and serve as its main striking force.

Since the end of World War II, the aircraft carrier has occupied a unique place in the American military arsenal as an instrument of Washington's military-political strategy. As a powerful and highly mobile weapon system, the aircraft carrier is widely used in combat and for the exertion of political pressure within the framework of a modern variety of "gunboat diplomacy." According to the data of a study conducted on the express orders of

the U.S. Department of the Navy, between 1955 and 1975 the U.S. Navy was involved in 99 international crises, and aircraft carriers were used in 59 of them.<sup>1</sup> Stressing the significance of aircraft carriers, former Secretary of State H. Kissinger said the following in one of his speeches: "In the crises in which we were involved, the use of naval power, particularly aircraft carriers, almost invariably represented the deciding element."<sup>2</sup>

In the 1970's the large U.S. aircraft carriers acquired influential enemies who were disturbed by the colossal increase in their cost and doubted their effectiveness as a means of solving U.S. foreign policy problems under new conditions. These beliefs were also fueled by the positive changes in the international situation in the direction of international detente, and by the defeat suffered by American imperialism in Vietnam, which shattered American illusions regarding the omnipotence of military force. Mounting interventionist attitudes in U.S. ruling circles, however, have recently revived the discussion of aircraft carriers as a necessary element of "gunboat politics."

Growing interventionist feeling has been accompanied by the growth of the U.S. military budget. A real increase of 5 percent in military expenditures is envisaged for fiscal year 1981, and the administration's proposed 5-year program specifies an average annual increase of 4.5 percent in military appropriations. Most of the additional funds will be used for naval construction. Speaking before the Business Council on 13 December 1979, J. Carter outlined the new military program and declared his "determination to see that the U.S. Navy remains stronger than the naval forces of any other country."

The United States has always spent huge amounts on the Navy. In recent years the Navy has invariably been allocated larger sums than the Army and Air Force. These sums rose from 24 billion dollars in 1972 to almost 42 billion in 1979.<sup>3</sup> According to Pentagon plans, this is how military budget expenditures will be distributed in the next 5 years: Expenditures on the Navy should be 16 percent greater than Air Force expenditures and 26 percent greater than expenditures on ground forces.<sup>4</sup>

The expediency of costly navy programs and, in particular, programs of aircraft carrier construction is nonetheless still being questioned in some military and political circles. The cost of these carriers has risen considerably in the postwar decades: The carrier "Midway" cost 90 million dollars, the "Forrestal" cost 189 million, the "America" cost 293 million, the "Enterprise" cost 339 million, the "Nimitz" cost 1,881 billion, and the cost of the new nuclear aircraft carrier should exceed 2 billion dollars. The construction of a heavy aircraft carrier and its maintenance for 30 years will take 15.5 billion dollars. The opponents of the carriers have asserted that these expenditures will make the carriers unable to compete with other weapon systems.

The choice of a particular direction in naval and aircraft carrier construction ultimately depends on the specific goals being pursued by American imperialism in the international arena, the particular regions and foreign policy issues that are being given priority, the proportional significance of military force in the total arsenal of means of exerting pressure, the place assigned for the navy in the structure of the armed forces, and the responsibilities delegated to the navy and to aircraft carriers.

The supplementation of the military arsenal with nuclear missiles necessitated the difficult process of adapting the navy to new forms and methods of combat. A variety of military technical achievements after World War II often served as grounds for the assertion that the significance of the navy had been sharply diminished by the reduction of its combat stability. The intensive concentration of strategic nuclear means in the sphere of navy actions, and the transformation of vast ocean expanses into strategic weapon launching sites did not neutralize the attacks on the navy, but focused them against all-purpose naval forces.

There is still no unanimous view on the role of the navy in various U.S. national security agencies. In particular, systems analysis experts in the Defense Department, headed by R. Murray, drafted a memorandum on military policy for the Carter Administration, assigning "limited objectives" for the Navy in preparations for operations against the developing countries and the organization of naval presence.<sup>5</sup> In turn, the Department of the Navy made counterproposals, set forth in "Sea Plan 2000." It envisages the active use of the Navy in the entire spectrum of combat operations, including all-out war.<sup>6</sup> The lack of agreement on this matter was admitted by Secretary of Defense H. Brown in a cautious and noncommittal statement in January 1979, which does confirm the significance of the Navy but also points out the following: "We are now trying to answer several difficult questions regarding the exact course to be taken by the Navy in its construction program and the use of its potential."<sup>7</sup>

It is obvious, however, that the U.S. military command does not share the "extremist" views regarding the declining importance of an all-purpose navy. Again, just as in the 1950's, the ability of aircraft carriers to deliver nuclear strikes is being stressed.<sup>8</sup>

To this end, the Atlantic forces of the United States have 1,000 pieces of nuclear ammunition, and the Pacific forces have 1,500.<sup>9</sup> The chief means of delivering this ammunition to targets are carrier-based A-6 and A-7 attack planes. The modified carrier-based F-4 and F-14 fighter planes are also expected to deliver nuclear strikes. Besides this, some of the antisubmarine defense planes and reconnaissance aircraft presently based on aircraft carriers could be replaced by attack planes, and the United States has already resorted to this tactic in past international crises.<sup>10</sup> Prominent American expert on naval affairs N. Polmar feels it is necessary to stress that carrier-based aviation can carry nuclear ammunition of megatonnage far exceeding the total megatonnage of the warheads of Polaris and Poseidon missiles installed on one submarine.<sup>11</sup>

The delivery of nuclear and non-nuclear strikes is to be conducted by all-purpose naval forces within the framework of two objectives set for them: "sea control" and "personnel transfer." "Sea control" implies the establishment of favorable conditions for the U.S. Navy in different parts of the world ocean to attain various combat objectives and to keep the enemy from attaining his objectives. The "personnel transfer" function signifies naval actions against objects on shore and includes carrier-based aviation operations, the artillery strikes of ships and the landing of amphibious troops.

Discussions of the ability of aircraft carriers to perform these functions are invariably accompanied by questions about their vulnerability. Aircraft carriers are the largest objects on the ocean surface and are therefore easily detectable. Now that many countries have developed highly accurate antiship missiles and have armed themselves with them, the effective camouflage of aircraft carriers has become more difficult. The carriers' detractors believe that the dimensions of these ships have turned them into clumsy "dinosaurs."

But the U.S. naval command feels that these ideas about the increased vulnerability of aircraft carriers are inaccurate. The fleet has been equipped with new aircraft, helicopters, antiaircraft and antisubmarine complexes which are capable of adequately protecting the carriers. Modifications of the design of aircraft carriers in the last 30 years have made them more viable and unsinkable. The takeoff and landing deck has been armored with steel plate. It can support up to 50 tons of aircraft. The modern aircraft carriers have solid hulls which reduce the effectiveness of missile and torpedo hits.

According to the data of former Secretary of the Navy W. Middendorf, an aircraft carrier like the "Nimitz" will not slow down after it has been struck by 10 large torpedos and will continue to operate even after the deck has been hit by 10 of the most powerful cruise missiles with conventional warheads.<sup>12</sup> The viability of this kind of ship is attested to by an accident on the carrier "Enterprise" in 1969, when nine bombs exploded on its deck. According to experts, it could have resumed flight operations just a few hours after the incident.<sup>13</sup>

Besides this, as N. Polmar stresses, the United States has not lost a single aircraft carrier since the end of World War II, and not one airplane has been destroyed on the deck of a carrier. During the same time, hundreds of Air Force bases on land have been destroyed in battle or lost for political reasons, and thousands of airplanes based there have been put out of commission. Aircraft carriers are the permanent property of the United States. They can be taken out of combat in one region and sent to another. Land bases, on the other hand, eventually have to be given up to allies, neutral states or even enemies. According to N. Polmar, former Chief of Naval Operations E. Zumwalt once said: "We are acquiring ships not because they are invulnerable, but because there is a need for them in spite of this vulnerability. Then we make an intense effort to reduce the vulnerability."<sup>14</sup>



The widespread discussions of the potential vulnerability of aircraft carriers in "sea control" and "personnel transfer" operations were "provoked" by their rising cost. Otherwise, this purely technical matter would never have gone beyond the bounds of specialized military literature. In the final analysis, the ability of naval forces to perform a third function, namely naval presence, will also be viewed through the same dollar prism. The forms of presence practiced by the United States for more than one decade represent an entire spectrum of military-political actions: They include "goodwill" visits of allied ports by military ships, the constant deployment of aircraft carrier units on "advance fronts" in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Pacific, and the temporary deployment of operational units of the fleet in crisis zones. In peacetime naval presence is supposed to "intimidate" the enemies of the United States and support its allies. In crisis situations, naval ships with Marine units and sub-units on board perform the functions of "firemen," prepared to defend U.S. imperialist interests at any time.

The effectiveness of naval presence is based on the threat to resort to military force and armed intervention if ongoing events should appear to be harming U.S. positions in a particular region. The performance of the presence function establishes conditions for the performance of the "personnel transfer" function. The interdependence of these two functions means that the attainment of the political goals of presence is based on the scales of potential "personnel transfers" and the combat characteristics of the ships responsible for this presence.

But the "effectiveness" of U.S. naval presence is now limited by objective factors, primarily the economic and military strength of the socialist community and its political influence.

Many American military experts believe that the significance of presence has undergone changes. Now it is "more likely to indicate U.S. concern rather than U.S. willingness to fight,"<sup>15</sup> writes Congressional Budget Office researcher D. Zackheim. "In the final analysis, the fleet can be withdrawn in the event of tension as easily as it can be deployed. Many analysts believe that diplomatic and economic instruments prevail over the deployment of naval forces in peacetime as the main foreign policy means in the U.S. arsenal,"<sup>16</sup> B. Biechman, former chief military analyst of the Brookings Institution, says in the same vein.

It is true that Washington has had to take changing circumstances into account. "Gunboat diplomacy" can no longer be as effective as it was at the beginning of the century in President T. Roosevelt's time, or in the 1950's under President D. Eisenhower, when the United States was pitting the strength of its fleet against weak colonial and semicolonial countries. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is the result of a loss of U.S. "will" to rely on military strength or U.S. feelings of "helplessness" in confrontations with the developing countries. The exact opposite is the reason: The weaknesses revealed in the strategy of naval presence have arisen in spite of the existence of American "will" and formidable military

potential, in spite of the developing countries' lack of illusions regarding the weakness of the United States. It is precisely the struggle of these countries for national independence and economic self-sufficiency, their vital need to fight this battle to the finish, augmented by the selfless assistance of the socialist countries and the very fact that these countries exist in the international arena, that are limiting and restricting the political influence of American naval presence and dooming U.S. armed intervention to failure.

No matter what kind of difficulties the United States has encountered in the conduct of naval presence, no matter how much it may cost--the maintenance of each aircraft carrier group on "advance frontiers" costs several tens of millions of dollars a year--the military command has no intention of curtailing it. The Pentagon has tried to justify this by setting forth the thesis of the "vicious circle." What exactly does this mean?

The United States, the leaders of the military establishment assert, is allegedly caught in a "vicious circle." On the one hand, the deployment of the fleet on "advance fronts" is a costly undertaking with an indefinite impact. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy priorities are partially judged according to the scales and intensity of this deployment.

This is why its reduction, not to mention its termination, would be interpreted as "weakness" or the prevalence of isolationist tendencies, which would ultimately cause irreversible harm to U.S. interests, not only in the deployment zone but in the rest of the world as well.

This thesis is a convenient bit of propaganda for Washington because it completely shifts the emphasis: The deployment of the American fleet thereby loses its offensive, aggressive nature and acquires defensive features. And the need for defense is substantiated by the mythical "Soviet threat" or the "threat" of the developing countries, which have dared to go against imperialist orders.

The United States constantly maintains its 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and its 7th Fleet in the West Pacific on "advance fronts." Plans to deploy the 5th Fleet in the Indian Ocean have been announced.

American naval presence has become a synonym for "aircraft carrier presence." Aircraft carriers represent the central element of advance groups of U.S. ships. They are the main attack element of U.S. all-purpose naval forces. Other surface ships--cruisers, destroyers and frigates--specialize in the antiaircraft and antisubmarine defense of aircraft carrier and amphibious groups and convoys.

The U.S. Navy now has 13 aircraft carriers: two nuclear carriers of the "Nimitz" type (displacement of 81,000 tons and space for 95 planes), one "Enterprise" nuclear aircraft carrier (75,000 tons, 90 planes), four carriers of the "Kitty Hawk" type (61,000 tons, 85 planes), four carriers of

the "Forrestal" type (60,000 tons, 85 planes), and two of the "Midway" type (52,000 tons, 75 planes). The United States also has large assault helicopter carriers, on which vertical takeoff and landing aircraft can be based: three of the "Tarawa" type (39,000 tons, 30 helicopters) and seven of the "Iwojima" type (18,000 tons, 20-24 helicopters). The 1979 Defense Department report speaks of the need to maintain 12 aircraft carriers until the end of the century: "Twelve aircraft carriers in operating order and ready for deployment will be enough to maintain our present policy--two carriers in the Mediterranean and two in the West Pacific."<sup>17</sup> The Pentagon's report for the next year, 1980, contains more specific instructions: "The existence of aircraft carriers in the Navy is basically made essential not by...the strategy of advance deployments but the need for the ability to quickly put attack forces in action in conflicts involving NATO and conflicts beyond the NATO zone."<sup>18</sup> The specified level of 12 aircraft carriers will coincide with the actual number of carriers in the U.S. Navy after the "Forrestal" carriers and other types are successively put in dry dock from fiscal year 1981 on for considerable modernization.

The 6th Fleet has 2 aircraft carriers, 14 escort ships, 4 assault submarines and 1 amphibious group.<sup>19</sup> According to official statements, the 6th Fleet is performing the important function of supporting allies and "friends" in the Mediterranean--whether these are states, political movements or specific leaders. The military command is aiming the 6th Fleet at the Near and Middle Eastern countries. Along with the "fast reaction corps," it constitutes the main force to be used in the seizure of oil deposits in several states of this region (this has been the Pentagon's script for U.S. military intervention in recent years). The exacerbation of tension in this region has been used by the United States more than once as a pretext for the reinforcement of the 6th Fleet, which has aggravated crisis situations even more. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, for example, another aircraft carrier group was added to this fleet and the total number of ships reached 60.

It is no secret that Israel regarded the 6th Fleet as a kind of "umbrella," under the cover of which it could act with impunity, when it planned its aggressive actions against Egypt and Syria. Recognizing this fleet as a basis of support for its expansionist policy, Israel has openly offered the United States a site near Haifa for the construction of a base for this fleet.

A common propagandistic ruse employed in NATO is the assertion that the existence of a Soviet Mediterranean squadron dictates the need for the presence and reinforcement of the 6th Fleet. As usual, everything is turned upside-down. The legal defensive measures taken by the Soviet Union after U.S. naval ships carrying nuclear weapons approached its borders are being called a "threat" to the security of the NATO allies.

The appearance of the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean Sea, which deprived the West's naval forces of the "free hand" they once enjoyed,

aroused a dual reaction in U.S. military circles. Some proposed that the 6th Fleet be supplemented by at least one more aircraft carrier group. Others, hoping to "find the key" to the military balance of power in the Mediterranean and change it in their own favor, have advocated the more flexible advance deployment of the fleet. They view permanent deployment as a wasteful expenditure of resources and have rejected the former proposal as an unnecessary "strain" on the budget of the U.S. Navy. Flexibility, they feel, can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, aircraft carriers should not be kept only in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Secondly, the number of carriers sent there should vary depending on the situation: Sometimes there might be six and at other times there might be none. Temporary deployment, in their opinion, will enhance the political and psychological effect of shows of military strength, which has supposedly been obscured by permanent presence.<sup>20</sup>

The U.S. Navy's largest operational unit--the 7th Fleet--has 2 aircraft carriers, 19 escort ships, 6 assault submarines and 2 amphibious groups.<sup>21</sup> Its zone of "responsibility" extends to the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The peacetime functions of the 7th Fleet do not differ from those of the 6th--the support of pro-American forces and the performance of "police" duties in the event of local changes inauspicious for the United States.

It is extremely indicative that the activities of the 7th Fleet have been applauded by Beijing, which is hoping to profit from the use of the "American card." The aggressive operations of this fleet against the PRC have been forgotten. Now American naval ships are being invited to enter Chinese ports.<sup>22</sup>

One of the fleet's aircraft carriers is usually located near Japan and another stays near the Philippines.<sup>23</sup> At times of crisis, additional aircraft carriers from another Pacific fleet--the 3d--are used to patrol the shores of Northeast Asia. Admiral T. Hayward, chief of naval operations, feels that the number of aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific forces should be increased from 6 to 7-9.<sup>24</sup>

The carrier debate has been going on for years in the United States.

Washington has openly resolved to guarantee the superiority of its naval forces. The debate centers merely around the question of the most economical means of attaining and consolidating this superiority.

The search is going on in three main areas: firstly, the more efficient use of existing aircraft carriers; secondly, increased reliance on means other than aircraft carriers; thirdly, the development of new types and categories of carrier ships.

The first tendency is connected with the changed nature of naval presence. It proposes the termination of the permanent presence in the Mediterranean



and West Pacific and a transfer to its flexible forms--that is, the dispatch of carrier groups at the specific times, to the specific regions, and in the specific quantities dictated by circumstances. This kind of reaction to a threat to U.S. interests, according to American strategists, will make demonstrations of the determination to resort to interventionist actions more convincing. The flexible form of presence will also, in their opinion, save money, as it will reduce the length of time these carriers will be kept on "advance fronts" and reduce the need for support vessels.

Another proposal suggests that the aircraft carriers should be based in ports in the presence zone instead of U.S. ports. The assumption is that this will reduce the number of carriers needed to support a vessel on "advance fronts." This means that either a few carriers could be withdrawn from regular forces and the four advance groups could be maintained, or that the number of the latter could be increased. The United States now has only one aircraft carrier based abroad--in Yokosuka (Japan). The possibility of this kind of basing in Greece, Israel, the Philippines, Portugal and England is being investigated. Some are in favor of constructing a naval base in Guam, which would cost 250-400 million dollars--a figure considerably lower than the price of a new nuclear aircraft carrier (2 billion dollars).<sup>25</sup>

Another alternative, which has been quite actively promoted in recent months, concerns the basing of a carrier on the island of Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean. This would simplify the establishment of permanent naval presence in this region in the form of a new operational unit--the 5th Fleet. Secretary of Defense H. Brown declared in his report to the Congress in 1980 that the possibility of basing a carrier overseas is being carefully investigated.<sup>26</sup>

At the end of February 1980, information regarding a memorandum sent to the Defense Department by Naval Chief of Operations T. Hayward was leaked to the American press. In this memorandum, Hayward advocated the renovation of one carrier of the "Hancock" type--the "Oriskany," with a full load displacement of 42,000 tons--and the equipping of this vessel with vertical takeoff and landing Harrier planes. In this way, the memo said, the number of carriers in regular naval forces would be increased to 14, which would make it possible to situate a carrier in the Indian Ocean permanently with minimum effort.<sup>27</sup>

Spokesmen for the second trend believe that modern multipurpose aircraft carriers are too strong a weapon for "minimum-threat" situations (this generally signifies operations against the developing countries), and they therefore advocate the formation of non-carrier operational groups. One of the alternative plans of naval construction analyzed in "Sea Plan 2000" envisages the creation of operational groups, with their nucleus consisting of ships armed with Aegis surface-to-air missile complexes.

Part of the burden of performing "sea control," "personnel transfer" and naval presence functions could be assigned, on a broader scale, according



to these naval experts, to land-based aviation whenever geographic conditions permit--as, for example, in the Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain-Norway zone.<sup>28</sup>

It is assumed that new weapon systems could either replace aircraft carriers in some regions or at least give them support. It has been suggested, for example, that the threat to NATO ships in the Atlantic could be eliminated within a few days if land-based aviation were equipped with the new "Captor" mines. The new cruise missiles of the surface-to-surface Harpoon category with a range of 100 kilometers and the Tomahawk with a range of 600 or more could also, according to some experts, make up for the shortage of carrier-based assault aircraft.

The third trend is connected with the search by concerned divisions of the Defense Department and private research corporations for smaller types of carriers, which could be used to supplement or replace heavy aircraft carriers powered by nuclear and non-nuclear fuel. These vessels, according to U.S. military circles, could heighten the combat stability of the fleet, distribute its offensive and defensive power among a greater number of carriers and increase possibilities for the distribution of carrier-based aviation in ocean theaters of military operations.

Within the framework of this last trend, three main alternatives stand out: the non-nuclear aircraft carrier with a displacement of 35,000-60,000 tons, the light air support vessel with a displacement of 20,000-35,000 tons and the so-called "sea control ship" with a displacement of up to 20,000 tons.<sup>29</sup>

According to the first plan, two different carriers could be built: one with a displacement of 35,000-40,000 tons and another of 55,000 or more. The difference in size would mean that the second vessel could accept any existing carrier-based planes in the United States, while the first could carry all planes but the F-14 fighter. Thirty planes would be based on the first and sixty on the second.

Carriers of this type have been objected to both by those who insist on the construction of large nuclear aircraft carriers and those who are striving to equip the U.S. Navy with quite small carriers. They agree that both variants essentially have all the defects of the "Nimitz" without having its advantages.

According to the second plan, the light air support ship should carry up to 30 helicopters and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Four such ships could be built and maintained for the sum needed to build and maintain one carrier of the "Nimitz" category. The tactical and technical features of the light air support ship, according to some American experts, will make it a more effective escort vessel than the cruiser, destroyer or frigate.

The idea of the so-called "sea control ship"--the third plan--was actively promoted by E. Zumwalt when he was chief of naval operations. It was

assumed that up to 12-14 helicopters and vertical takeoff and landing planes could operate from this kind of ship. For the price of one nuclear aircraft carrier, eight "sea control ships" could be built. But their combat potential was judged to be extremely limited, and they would have to depend on large carriers for material and technical support. This is why the naval command tends to see this as a less promising plan.

Another alternative to the aircraft carrier should also be mentioned--the construction of large ships, with a speed of up to 100 knots or more, on the dynamic support principle. Armed with antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters, they could, according to some experts, become an important element in the organization of reliable antisubmarine defense, considering the significant difference in the speeds of conventional surface ships and submarines.

The battle now being fought in the United States over the construction of new carriers has been going on ever since World War II. Its present intensity is due to the rapid rise in the cost of large nuclear aircraft carriers. Nonetheless, the armed services committees of both houses of the U.S. Congress approved the acquisition of a fourth carrier of the "Nimitz" type when the draft defense budget for fiscal year 1979 was being discussed. When President J. Carter vetoed Congress' decision to allocate the funds needed for its construction, he promised to carefully investigate alternative programs in this field.

The defense secretary's report on the military budget for fiscal year 1980 made the compromisory proposal of the current administration public. It chose an aircraft carrier with the same displacement as the "Midway," which can accommodate up to 60-65 planes, including the F-14 and E-2C. According to the administration's explanation of this decision, the carrier of intermediate dimensions was chosen on the basis of cost. Although the administration admitted that the "Forrestal" or "Nimitz" had higher combat potential than the proposed ship, it also indicated that the maintenance of a heavy aircraft carrier for 30 years would cost 5-6 billion dollars more.

When Congress examined the draft defense budget for fiscal year 1980, however, the supporters of a fourth nuclear carrier of the "Nimitz" type prevailed.

Recent events, particularly the Iranian-American crisis, have lent new intensity to the debates concerning the expediency of constructing heavy aircraft carriers. When Chairman J. Stennis of the Armed Services Committee discussed the need, in connection with this crisis, to be prepared for combat in the developing countries, he advocated the production of lighter and cheaper equipment instead of the superexpensive and superpowerful "Nimitz." This view is shared by Senator G. Hart, who feels that "the United States should distribute its naval forces among all seas and oceans instead of perpetuating their concentration in a small number of aircraft carrier units."<sup>30</sup> On the whole, however, civilian and military leaders agree that

the construction of light aircraft carriers should be postponed until such time as a reliable and effective vertical takeoff and landing plane, capable of competing with existing carrier-based fighter and assault aircraft, can be developed. It is probable, however, that more attention will be paid in the future to diversification in the construction of carrier vessels--that is, the equipping of the fleet with minimum-displacement carriers.

Despite the heated debates over the present and future role of the aircraft carriers, they still occupy a significant place in U.S. imperialist strategy. It is unlikely that their significance as the main assault element of American all-purpose naval forces will be diminished in the near future.

#### FOOTNOTES

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